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This article seeks to draw attention to certain ethical misconduct of litigators that
is routinely accepted, tolerated, or ignored by the legal profession. Though there
are other examples, the author focuses on conduct prohibited by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11. In particular, the author concentrates on that rule's so-
called "safe harbor"provision, which he argues serves to insulate, and possibly
encourage, illegitimate advocacy in the form of the assertion and maintenance of
frivolous claims, defenses, or other contentions-ironically, the very conduct
that the rule was ostensibly intended to deter. Regardless of the frequency of this
sort of misbehavior, the offending attorney can, as a practical matter, escape
both court sanctions and professional discipline. In an effort to end the toleration
of those who habitually engage in such an illegitimate fashion, the author
proposes an enhancement of the ethical duty to report through the creation and
maintenance of "litigation misconduct databases" that will monitor this and
other unethical litigation behavior, which presently is de facto unregulated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession is, by and large, self-regulating.' Beginning as early
as 1836 with David Hoffinan's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
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Deportment,2 and continuing through to the present, widely-adopted Model Rules
of Professional Conduct,3 lawyers, including judges, have drafted and
'The primary reason for permitting lawyers to regulate themselves is to maintain the
independence of the profession. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § I cmt. d (2000); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 2
(1990). Lawyers' perceived commitment to social justice and their role as protectors of the
public good, so the argument goes, would be compromised if the profession were beholden to
the watchful authority of some outside regulator. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr,
Preamble 10 (2000), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2001
SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2001) [hereinafter MORGAN &
ROTUNDA] ("Self-regulation ... helps maintain the legal profession's independence from
government domination."). By allowing lawyers to self-regulate, it is believed that the
profession will be insulated from potential government or other non-legal corrupting influences
that could hinder the effective performance of their duties to society. See id. ("An independent
legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on
government for the right to practice."); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105
HARV. L. REV. 799, 812-13 (1992). Furthermore, at a more basic level, the complexities of the
law warrant regulation by those trained in the law. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 2.1, at 20-21 (1986); see also Wilkins, supra, at 812 (noting the argument of
bar leadership that disciplinary agencies are more effective "ethics" enforcers because of unique
expertise). In other words, non-lawyers have traditionally been thought to lack the technical
knowledge and insight to regulate the legal profession fairly and effectively. See FREEDMAN,
supra, at 2 (noting that one rationale for self-regulation may be that "law practice is too esoteric
and complex for nonlawyers to regulate"). But see infra note 4; WOLFRAM, supra, § 2.1, at 21
(observing that the contention that law practice issues are commonly complex and that "only
lawyers can and will comprehend them is highly dubious").
There are, of course, other, less noble, but very plausible reasons for attorney self-
regulation. For example, it permits lawyers to maintain a monopoly on the provision of legal
services. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 653-57 (1981); William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics
of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 485, 493 (1995). Another
possible reason may be a desire to "immunize themselves against effective external control,"
which is directly related to the claim that law practice is too complex for laypeople to
understand. WOLFRAM, supra, § 2.1, at 21.2 Following Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions, The Honorable George Sharswood authored his
Essay on Professional Ethics in 1854 which in turn strongly influenced the content of
Alabama's Code of Professional Ethics (1887) and the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Canons of Professional Ethics (1908). See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
ETHICS 111-12 (2d ed. 1995); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr § 1.9 (3d ed.
2001). The largely aspirational and vague Canons were eventually replaced by the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") in 1969. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.3,
at 56.
3The ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983 to replace the more
cumbersome Model Code. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.4, at 62. As of the year 2001, it
appears that forty-four states and the District of Columbia had either adopted or were on their
way to adopting some version of the Model Rules. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at
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administered standards that govern the so-called "ethics" of the legal profession.4
Moreover, lawyers in most jurisdictions are required to report certain ethical
transgiessions of fellow attorneys to the appropriate disciplinary body.5 This
153-56 (Chart on Lawyer Screening); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE
LAwYER's DEsKBOOK ON PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY § 1-1.5.4 (2000-2001 ed.) [hereinafter
ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS]. Most of the remaining states retain versions of the Model Code,
which incorporate the substance of some Model Rules. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROF'L CONDUCT 01:3-4 (2001) [hereinafter LAWYERS' MANUAL]. California has its own
ethical code. See id. at 01:3; WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.5, at 64.
4Although the structure of most state disciplinary systems varies, almost all states
generally model their disciplinary procedures and organizational structure in a, fashion
consistent with the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. See HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 2, § 1.16; LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 101:2004. The typical
structure places "supervisory control ... in the [ultimate] hands of the judiciary ..... HAZARD
& HODES, supra note 2, § 1.16, at 1-28; see also LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at
101:2006-07. Other components of most disciplinary systems include: disciplinary counsel
(essentially the prosecutors); hearing or grievance committees; and disciplinary boards. See
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 101:2004-07. Lawyers have traditionally been the only
participants in the disciplinary process. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Lawyers'
Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1547, 1599 (1994) [hereinafter
Lawyers' Responsibilities]. Many state disciplinary boards and/or hearing committees are
comprised entirely of attorneys. See id. at 1599-1600. The growing majority of such bodies,
however, have at least some level of non-lawyer participation in the disciplinary process. See
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 101:2005-06 (noting that Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement recommend non-lawyer membership on both hearing committees
and disciplinary boards and recognizing adherence to this recommendation); WOLFRAM, supra
note 1, § 2.5, at 46; Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra, at 1599-1600. But it appears that non-
lawyers never constitute a majority of any of these boards or committees. See LAWYERS'
MANUAL, supra note 3, at 101:2005-06; WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.5, at 46; Lawyers'
Responsibilities, supra, at 1599-1600. Furthermore, the selection of participants in the process
is typically carried out by organizations of lawyers. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 21.
In addition to such administrative bodies, lawyer conduct may also be regulated directly by
the court system. Such regulation either takes the form of the state's supreme court exercising
ultimate authority over the administrative disciplinary bodies or other courts imposing sanctions
directly upon attorneys practicing before them (e.g., disqualification, monetary sanctions, etc.).
See LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 101:2006; HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 1.6;
WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 21 and § 3A.5, at 111. An additional court-related
mechanism for regulating attorney behavior is, of course, civil liability, typically in the form of
malpractice suits. See HAzARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 104; WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.1,
at 21. For a thorough discussion of these and other processes available for regulating attorney
behavior, see generally Wilkins, supra note 1.5 Laura Gatland, The Himmel Effect: 'Snitch Rule'Remains Controversial but Effective,
Especially in Illinois, 83 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (1997); see also Julie L. Hussey, Comment,
Reporting Another Attorney for Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct: The Current
Status of the Law in the States Which have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
23 J. LEGALPROF. 265 (1998-1999). Model Rule 8.3 provides that:
2001] 1557
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
requirement is intended to be an indispensable part of our system of self-
regulation.6 Specifically, because lawyers possess specialized knowledge of the
law and the legal system, they are best able to recognize serious ethical violations
and therefore should be not only effective drafters, but also enforcers of the
profession's ethical rules.
7
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that ajudge has committed a violation of applicable
rules ofjudicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office
shall inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6 or information gained by a lawyer or judge while serving as a member of an approved
lawyers assistance program to the extent that such information would be confidential if it
were communicated subject to the attomey-client privilege.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra
note 1, at 105. Approximately forty states have adopted Model Rule 8.3, either verbatim or
some variation thereof. See Gatland, supra, at 24; see also Hussey, supra, at 270-71 (noting
variations from state to state, including some using "should report" rather than "shall report").
At present, California and Kentucky appear to be the only jurisdictions that do not have a
reporting requirement. See Parker D. Eastin, Note, Should Kentucky Impose an Enforceable
Duty on Lawyers to Report Other Lawyers' Professional Misconduct?, 87 KY. L. 1271, 1272
(1998-99); see also Michael J. Burwick, Note, You Dirty Rat.! Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory
Reporting of Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 137 (1994) (noting that in
some states the duty to report is mandatory, while in others it is merely discretionary). The
remaining jurisdictions have reporting rules that seem to be modeled after Model Code
provision DR 1-103.
It should also be noted that judges in most jurisdictions are likewise required to report
ethical misconduct of lawyers to the appropriate authorities. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 3(D)(2) (1990), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 756-57
("A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct... that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.").
For further discussion regarding the duty to report, see infra Part I.
6 See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical
Analysis ofLawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGALETHICS 175, 175 (1999) (noting that duty
to report is "crucial to the legal profession's ability and right to regulate itself'); see also Gerard
E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 537 (1986) (noting that "[b]ecause
lawyers are members of a self-governing, self-policing profession, one could argue that a
reporting obligation would serve a special need of the bar").7See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 21; Wilkins, supra note 1, at 812; see also N.Y.
COMM. ON PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, THE ATORNEY's DUTES TO REPORT THE MISCONDUCT OF
OTHER ATTORNEYS AND TO REPORT FRAUD ON A TRIBUNAL, reprinted in 47 THm RECORD OF
THE AssOcIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 905, 906 (1992) [hereinafter NYC
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT] (noting that "reporting requirements are a particularly useful
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Nevertheless, attorneys routinely ignore, or at least fail to fulfill, the ethical
obligation to report the misconduct of other lawyers.' There are various
explanations for this troubling reality,9 but the root of the problem appears to be a
instrument for maintaining ethical standards in the practice of law because they utilize the
knowledge of the persons most likely to discover first when those ethical standards are
breached").
8 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROF'L RESPONsIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD
70 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that bar disciplinary systems "rely almost exclusively on client
grievances ... as sources of information about attomey misconduct"'); WOLFRAM, supra note 1,
§ 12.10.1, at 683 (noting that "[p]robably no other professional requirement is as widely
ignored by lawyers subject to it" as the duty to report); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty
to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
977, 979 (1988) (noting the disinclination of lawyers to report fellow members of the bar to
disciplinary authorities); Wilkins, supra note 1, at 822-23 (noting that the vast majority of
disciplinary complaints are filed by clients rather than lawyers or judges); Burwick, supra note
5, at 143 (stating that the legal profession has viewed Model Rule 8.3 "as a Pandora's box
which attorneys have been reluctant to open"); Hussey, supra note 5, at 265 (observing that
"[m]ost attomeys will agree with this rule on the surface, simultaneously knowing that they
would never report a colleague").
9See generally Lynch, supra note 6. Probably the most obvious and simplistic reason Why
lawyers fail to report the misconduct of fellow attorneys is that no one wants to be a "snitch."
See id. at 518-22 (observing the general societal bias against those who "inform" with regard to
the wrongdoing of others); Richmond, supra note 6, at 176 (noting "general professional
ambivalence toward those who report others' wrongdoing to appropriate authorities"). A more
sophisticated explanation may stem from a concem with regard to whether or not perceived
misconduct actually rises to the level of a reportable ethical violation, or whether one possesses
sufficient "knowledge" to conclude that such an ethical violation in fact occurred. See, e.g.,
RHODE, supra note 8, at 70 (noting that "[w]hat constitutes an incompetent performance or an
unreasonable fee is often difficult to assess except at the extremes"); WOLFRAM, supra note I,
§ 12.10.1, at 684 (observing that Model Rule 8.3 is "unfortunately vague and indefinite");
Lynch, supra note 6, at 506-15 (noting the difficulties associated with the recognition of an
ethical violation and the determination of the existence of the requisite knowledge thereof);
Richmond, supra note 6, at 185 (noting problems created by the failure of Model Rule 8.3(a) to
define what constitutes "knowledge"); Burwick, supra note 5, at 143 (observing that
"Pandora's box" potential of Model Rule 8.3 is one explanation for its rare invocation). This
form of reticence is likely the result of the worry that one day "the shoe could be on the other
foot." See RHODE, supra note 8, at 70 (noting that "[m]any lawyers do not feel sufficiently
blameless to cast the first stone unless they are sure of a fellow practitioner's serious
misconduct"); Wilkins, supra note 1, at 822-23 (observing that reporting disincentive may
stem from a desire to avoid the risk of "inviting a retaliatory response"). Another very practical
reason for failure to report may simply be a desire to avoid the perceived hassle associated with
filing a formal disciplinary complaint. Furthermore, the perception that a reported violation is
likely to go unpunished "has been a major rationale and rationalization for non-reporting'
RHODE, supra note 8, at 70. Finally, many lawyers are either unfamiliar with the obligation to
report, or else do not take this ethical requirement seriously, given that it is largely
unenforceable. See, e.g., NYC PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 907 (noting
possibility that reporting requirements may not be taken seriously by lawyers and disciplinary
bodies). But see In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1l. 1988) (suspending lawyer for one year for
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general acceptance or tolerance of attorney misbehavior, particularly in the
litigation context.'0 Indeed, much of the conduct that lawyers, as well as judges,
detest and complain about the most is behavior that they habitually rationalize as
part of the adversary process." The adversary system itself creates an
environment in which certain objectively unacceptable practices are protected,
tolerated, or ignored, notwithstanding their illegitimate nature.12 This article will
failure to report another attorney to disciplinary authorities); see also Rotunda, supra note 8. For
further elaboration on the reasons why lawyers tend not to report other members of the bar, see
infra Part III.
10 Cf Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 949, 953
(1995) (noting that "[w]hen even a few judges tolerate the Rambo Lawyer's misconduct, the
administration of justice suffers, and it leads to repetition of that conduct by other lawyers");
Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-Minded Ethics and Low-Down Tactics in the
Courts, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 81, 83 (1991) (arguing that 'judicial tolerance of the intolerable is
a substantial factor which lies at the root of the Rambo litigation phenomenon"); infra notes
11-12,113.
"See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 10, at 91 (observing that in California certain "courtroom
improprieties are tolerated by the bench not because .... courts favor misconduct, but because
they rationalize away the immorality of their approach for the sake of preferred outcomes and
case dispositions"); see also supra note 10; infra notes 12, 113. The acceptance by practicing
lawyers of such litigation misconduct is likely attributable, at least in part, to the perception (and
apparent reality) that judges themselves are tolerant of this sort of misbehavior. See infra note
113; see also infra note 231.
In addition, Judge William W. Schwarzer has aptly noted the danger associated with such
tolerance in the context of Rule 11 violations: "Misconduct, once tolerated, will breed more
misconduct and those who might seek relief against abuse will instead resort to it in self-
defense." William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11--A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 205 (1985) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Sanctions]. Judge Schwarzer also wisely
observed that "vigorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being free to pursue litigation
tactics that they cannot justify as legitimate." Id. at 184.
'
2Chief Justice Warren E. Burger made a similar observation in 1976, when he noted the
existence, "[c]orrect or not," of a "widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are
overly tolerant to lawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects of the adversary
system to their own private advantage at public expense," Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000
A.D.--A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Keynote Address Before the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 7-9, 1976),
reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83, 91 (1976). This "widespread feeling' observed by Chief Justice
Burger was likely an accurate perception of the "overly toleranf' acceptance of what might be
termed "hyper-advocacy" in 1976, and the situation has almost certainly worsened since that
time. See Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical
Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN., L. REV. 7, 50 (1987) (noting that "[i]n an adversary culture
where some forms of cheating are unwritten rules of the game, even observed violations are
often greeted with fraternal tolerance by opposing counsel and trial judges"); see also infra note
231. Indeed, as this article will discuss, the profession's current tolerance of attomey
misconduct is, under certain circumstances, actually encouraged, or at least facilitated, by the
litigation process and the rules that govern it. See infra Part II. See generally Kanner, supra note
10.
Professor Monroe Freedman has expressed a contrary view, noting that:
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focus upon one area of litigation abuse that has been granted protection or
legitimacy by the very rule that was ostensibly promulgated to curtail it-the
maintenance of frivolous or abusive filings in the face of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 ("Rule 1l').13
Under amended Rule 11, a "pleading, written motion, or other paper" that is
filed for an improper purpose, or lacks an appropriate legal or factual foundation,
supposedly subjects the attorney responsible for such a filing to sanctions. 14
"Supposedly" because the current rule contains a safe harbor provision that
allows the illegitimate advocate an opportunity to avoid sanctions, despite having
committed a violation, by withdrawing or correcting the offensive paper within
twenty-one days of service of a motion thereunder.
5
Rule 1 's safe harbor provision not only permits a recalcitrant attorney to
elude sanctions from the trial court, it also insulates him or her from any form of
parallel professional discipline. The prevailing view, albeit incorrect, seems to be
that the misconduct, tolerated and protected by Rule 11, is not the sort of
unethical behavior that should trigger an attorney's duty to report.' 6 As a result,
the very mechanism intended from its inception to deter frivolous filings in
federal court now serves as a safety net for illegitimate advocates who wish to
abuse the system.
This illogical procedure, whereby an aspect of the adversary system serves as
a shield for the unworthy, is by no means limited to the Rule 11 context. 17 This
Judges have been abusing their powers to sanction lawyers, and, at a lower level of
public visibility, they have been making indiscriminate threats against lawyers in the
course of litigation. As a result, lawyers are being chilled in fulfilling their responsibilities
to their clients, and the adversary system is indeed being significantly impaired.
FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 82.
13 There is no doubt that frivolous filings also occur in state courts, and the points that will
be raised in this article should certainly be considered in the context of those courts as well. All
states have rule-based or statutory counterparts to Rule 11 that are ver similar in purpose,
content, and/or operation. See LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 61:178-79; Byron C.
Keeling, Toward a BalancedApproach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review ofFederal
Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1073 & n.25 (1994). The
reason for limiting the scope of this article's analysis to Rule I1 is merely to present the issues
and arguments in a more uniform and coherent fashion.
14See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. For the full text of the rule, see infra note 50.
15See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
16See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. As will be discussed in section C of Part
HI, it is my position that such misconduct is definitely the type of unethical behavior that should
be reported, particularly when it occurs on more than one occasion.
17 There are likewise other "unethical," or at least "questionable" litigation practices
besides frivolous filings in which attorneys engage that are similarly protected, tolerated, or
ignored by the system. Cf Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect
Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 959 (1998) (arguing that changes in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have contributed to the "perceived decline in ethical stature
and social utility of the legal profession" by facilitating partisan behavior through diminution in
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article utilizes the example of Rule 11 because it provides a familiar vehicle for
examination of the general problem, and a prototypical solution, which is the
creation of a more efficient and accessible "duty to report" through the
implementation of "litigation misconduct databases."
Part I of this article will explore the history of the disciplinary component of
Rule 11 and how the current version of the rule departs from this tradition by
providing sanctuary for offending attorneys"8 who should be subject to some form
of professional discipline. Part I will discuss how the inefficacy of the ethical
duty to report attorney misconduct (as embodied in Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.3) exacerbates the problem by further insulating such improper
behavior. This article will conclude in Part IV with a detailed proposal calling for
a change to the current mechanism for reporting attorney misconduct through the
institution of "litigation misconduct databases," maintained by disciplinary
authorities to monitor illegitimate advocacy and to identify and sanction those
attorneys who habitually abuse the litigation process.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
A. The Evolution ofRule 11
The original 1938 version of Rule 1119 evidenced a clear intent on the part of
the drafters to deter frivolous20 or abusive litigation in federal court, at least in
the "importance ofjudicial application of law to fact"). This article focuses solely on Rule 11 as
a means of highlighting by example the ethical concerns created in the litigation context when
the judicial system appears to foster tolerance or acceptance of certain forms of misconduct.
The ethical issues and concerns addressed in this article, and the ultimate solution proposed, for
example, are equally applicable to such problems as discovery abuse and discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. Consequently, the article should be considered in a fashion broader than
its subject matter limitation might otherwise suggest. For a thorough and thoughtful
examination of ethical concerns in the context of civil discovery, see John S. Beckerman,
Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505 (2000).
8Rule 11 applies to parties to litigation also, but because this article is only concerned
with the behavior of lawyers, it will focus solely on Rule 1 I's application to and effect on
attorneys.
19In 1938, Rule 11 provided that:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that averments of an answer under oath must
be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has, read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, it may
be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not
1562 [Vol. 62:1555
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part, by way of disciplinary action.2' The text of the rule provided that: "For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action. 22 A similar remedy was likewise available if "scandalous or
been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is
inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938). Because I will be referring to three separate versions of Rule 11, for
clarity, I will identify the two earlier versions of the rule by placing their effective dates in
parenthesis following each citation thereto.
20 There are innumerable variations on what constitutes a "frivolous" claim or action,
which in the end appear to amount to little more than an "I know it when I see it" standard. See
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.12, at 27-25 (alluding to Justice Potter Stewart's famous
quote regarding the recognition of what constitutes pornography); see also Sanford Levinson,
Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 370
(1986). The traditional definition of"frivolous" is "obviously false upon the face of a pleading,
as when something was pleaded that conflicted with ajudicially noticeable fact or was logically
impossible...." D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some
"Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18
(1976-1977). In addition, the United States Supreme Court has defined a "frivolous" complaint
in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) as one that "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989); see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that, for purposes of Rule 11, a claim is
frivolous when "it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the
existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or
reverse the law as it stands"); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 110 cmt. d (2000) ("A frivolous position is one that a lawyer of ordinary competence would
recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no substantial possibility that the tribunal would
accept it."); Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial
System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671, 682 (1997) (suggesting that "the appropriate definition
of a frivolous legal contention is one that objectively has less than a de minimis chance of
success, with de minimis being defined as five percent"); Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to
Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 197-201 (1994) (noting how various courts have defined
"frivolous" under Rule 11 and in similar contexts) [hereinafter Tobias, 1993 Revision]. See
generally Samuel J. Levine, Seeking a Common Language for the Application of Rule 11
Sanctions: What is "Frivolous"?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 677 (1999); Levinson, supra. But see
Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and
Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1996) (essentially arguing that there is no such thing as a
frivolous case). For further elaboration of Professor Yablon's position, see infia note 81.21 It is also important to note that the drafters of the 1938 version appear to have been
much more concerned with preventing attorneys from intentionally abusing the litigation
process, rather than deterring the assertion of positions that were objectively without legal or
factual merit. See Keeling, supra note 13, at 1075. This suggests a desire to focus on conduct
that is truly abusive. Ironically, as discussed later, the 1993 version, operating in isolation from
the ethical rules, appears to insulate rather than punish such wrongdoers insofar as they can
shelter themselves from Rule 11 sanctions by taking advantage of the rule's "safe harbor"
provision. See infra Part II. B.22FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938) (emphasis added). For violations that were not willful, the
appropriate sanction was apparently to strike the offending pleading. See id. Courts, however,
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indecent' matters were contained in a signed pleading.23 "Appropriate
disciplinary action" could have included a "[p]unitive fine or imprisonment
through the contempt power, formal reprimand by the court, or even
disbarment .... t,24 I seems apparent that, unlike the other Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 11 was not simply intended as another tool for "secur[ing] the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."25 The original
language of Rule 11 clearly suggested an intention to provide an alternative
mechanism for regulating attorney conduct26 besides the "regulation" that was
then ostensibly offered by the Canons of Professional Ethics,27 adopted by most
rarely resorted to this sanction. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118
F.R.D. 189, 191 (1988) [hereinafter Vairo, Critical Analysis].
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938); see also Risinger, supra note 20, at 14.
24 Risinger, supra note 20, at 43. But see Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under
New Federal CivilRule 11, 61 TENN. L. REV. 37,40 (1993) (observing that the 1938 version of
Rule 11 "failed to elaborate on or illustrate what might constitute 'appropriate disciplinary
action") [hereinafter Parness, Disciplinary Referrals].25FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CWIL PROCEDURE I (3d ed. 1999)
("[']he purpose underlying the establishment of most rules of civil procedure, in any judicial
system, is to promote the just, efficient, and economical resolution of civil disputes.").26See supra note 19; ef George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 61 MISS. L.J.
5, 16 (1991) (noting that the 1983 version of Rule 11 "generates disciplinary power within the
federal court system which has heretofore been the sole dominion of state licensing bodies"). It
is also significant to note that commentators have observed that later versions of Rule 11
likewise maintained, or possibly increased, this emphasis on the regulation of attorney behavior.
See Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance:
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1987); Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11
As a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REv. 793, 798 (1991); Judith A.
McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959, 972-73 (1991);
Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Federal Rule 11: Are the Federal District Courts
Usurping the Disciplinary Function of the Bar?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 67 (1997); William W.
Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 7, 7 (1994) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, New Era]; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
589, 599 (1998) [hereinafter Vairo, Rule 11]; see also infra note 131 and accompanying text.
27 For the bulk of the period during which the 1938 version of Rule 11 was in effect, so-
called "lawyer ethics" was informed and, to a certain extent, governed by a broad set of largely
aspirational edicts promulgated by the ABA, known as the Canons of Professional Ethics. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.1, at 50, 53-56. The importance of the Canons with respect to
the actual regulation of attorney conduct was certainly suspect, given their somewhat unrealistic
moral benchmarks. See id. (noting that "the Canons were widely ignored or superfluous for
many regulatory purposes"). Furthermore, it is widely accepted that one of the primary
motivations underlying the enactment of the Canons was to impede the practice of law by
certain individuals-specifically, those who were not "native-bom, white, Anglo-Saxon
Protestant[s]." FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 3; see also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 106-08 (1976) (noting distress
among the organized bar with "the influx of foreigners" to the profession during the early
1900s). The Canons evidenced an obvious class and ethnic bias insofar as many of them
condemned common practices employed by ethnic minorities (e.g., contingency fees). Id. at
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state disciplinary bodies at that time.28 Nevertheless, it is possible that the drafters
simply intended the disciplinary sanctions to be a meaningful method for courts to
deter abuse and thus better manage and streamline the litigation process. 9
Whatever the rationale, it cannot be disputed that attorney discipline was an
original component of Rule 11?.3
Despite being equipped with the tools to deal sternly and effectively with
litigation abuse, the bench and bar almost never invoked the 1938 version of Rule
11.31 The reasons for this lack of use range from the difficulty in. proving a
violation,32 to the wholly discretionary nature of the sanctions, to the innate
44-53. The enactment of the Canons represented but one step, among various others, designed
to protect the "sanctity" of the legal profession. See generally id. at 106-29. In light of the
Canons' tainted pedigree, it is arguable that Rule 11 actually provided a better, or at least more
legitimate, vehicle for regulating attomey conduct during this time period.
28 See RHODE, supra note 8, at 44; WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.2, at 55-56.29 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also T. E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE RULE
11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 21 (1988) (noting that "[a]n overarching view of Rule 11 sanctions is
that they are part of a package of case management tools that are designed to enable judges to
separate cases that warrant full judicial attention from those that are frivolous or meritless").3 0The apparent discipline contemplated under the 1938 version seems to have been
confined to the federal forum. For example, a federal district court could have suspended or
disbarred an offending attorney from practicing before that specific court. See GREGORY P.
JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 269 (2d ed. 1994); Jeffrey A.
Pamess, Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule II: The New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-
and-Think Again" Rule, 1993 BYU L. REV. 879, 906 (1993) [hereinafter Pamess, Fines]. A
state body could choose to suspend or disbar the lawyer as well;, based upon the federal court's
decision, but it could not be required to do so. See, eg., McMorrow, supra note 26, at 965.
Nevertheless, it would certainly have been appropriate for a federal court to file a complaint
with or make a referral to an appropriate state disciplinary authority following that court's
finding of a Rule 11 violation. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon (3)(3)(2)
(1990), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 756-57; cf. JOSEPH, supra, at 269
(noting that such sanctions as suspension or disbarment may trigger the procedural need to
make a referral to the appropriate federal court disciplinary committee). Indeed, this is precisely
what courts should do, even under the 1993 version of Rule 11. See Kramer, supra note 26, at
808-09. But see Cochran, supra note 26, at 16 (noting failure of courts to refer Rule 11
violations to disciplinary bodies). See generally Parness, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24;
Ripps & Drowatzky, supra note 26.31 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments; Risinger, supra
note 20, at 34-35; Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 8; Schwarzer, Sanctions, supra note
11, at 183; Vairo, Critical Analysis, supra note 22, at 191; Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at
596. 32 Under the 1938 version of Rule 11, it was generally understood that one had to establish
that the alleged recalcitrant attorney exhibited subjective bad faith, i.e., that he or she knowingly
pursued a claim or position lacking "good ground to support it." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938); see
also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that
the 1938 version of Rule 11 "contemplated sanctions only where there was a showing of bad
faith"); Keeling, supra note 13, at 1075; Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of
Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 947 (1992); William 1. Weston, Court-Ordered Sanctions of
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reluctance throughout the profession to pursue sanctions against fellow members
of the bar.
33
As a result of the chronic failure of lawyers and judges to use Rule 11, and to
thereby achieve its goal of deterring frivolous litigation, the rule was amended in
1983.?4 Most notably, the revisions35 changed the subjective bad faith standard for
Attorneys: A Concept that Duplicates the Role ofAttorney Disciplinary Procedures, 94 DICK.
L. REV. 897, 904 n.35 (1990). See generally Risinger, supra note 20, at 52-61. Even though
this subjective standard appeared to be the appropriate measure for judging misconduct under
the rule, commentators nevertheless noted confusion surrounding the applicable standard of
conduct, which also contributed to the widespread reluctance to invoke Rule 11. See SAUL M.
KASSIN, AN EMWRCAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCriONs 3 (1985); Edward D. Cavanagh, Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Case Against Turning Back the Clock 162 F.R.D.
383,387 (1995); Vairo, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 22, at 191.
33See KASSIN, supra note 32, at 4 (recognizing general reluctance of judges to impose
sanctions); Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 388 (noting courts' hesitancy to "dress-down members
of the bar"); Risinger, supra note 20, at 47 (noting that "American lawyers and American courts
have always been less than aggressive in using their powers to fasten liability onto other
lawyers"); Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 8 (observing general judicial disinclination to
impose sanctions); Schwarzer, Sanctions, supra note 11, at 183 (noting that "lawyers are
generally reluctant to seek sanctions and judges to impose them"); Vairo, Critical Analysis,
supra note 22, at 191 (noting reluctance of attorneys to use Rule 11 against one'another). This
reluctance with regard to pursuing sanctions under the 1938 version of Rule 11 is obviously
parallel to lawyers' longstanding reluctance to report ethical misconduct; see supra notes 8-9
and accompanying text. See also infra Part III.34See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments ("The new
language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions ... by emphasizing
the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of
sanctions.').35The 1983 version of Rule 11 provided as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of
an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper, that to the best of the his knowledge, information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
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determining a violation to one of objective reasonableness 3 6 and made the
imposition of sanctions mandatory, hence eliminating any element of judicial
discretion in this regard.37 Lawyers were thus more apt to resort to Rule 11 given
that a violation was easier to prove, and, if proved, a sanction was certain.3
Unfortunately, the 1983 amendments did more than create an effective tool
for fending off frivolous claims and positions; they converted Rule 11 into an
offensive litigation weapon, used and abused far too frequently. 39 Empirical
studies of the impact of Rule 11 following the 1983 changes invariably reveal that
the revisions spawned a veritable explosion of satellite litigation.40 Between 1983
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).36The standard to be applied under the 1983 version was objective in nature; however,
there was apparently some initial confusion in this regard. See Vairo, Critical Analysis, supra
note 22, at 205-07. Although it seems that all circuits had adopted an objective test by the late
eighties, to the extent that any doubt remained, the issue seems to have been definitively settled
by the Supreme Court in two cases: Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 U.S. 384, 392-93
(1990), which discusses the change in the 1983 version of Rule 11 to an objective standard of
"reasonable inquiry," and Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 498
U.S. 533, (1991), which held that Rule 11 "imposes an objective standard of reasonable inquiry
on represented parties who sign papers and pleadings[,]" as well as on their counsel. Id. at 554;
see also Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 388-89.37The only discretion that courts possessed under the revised rule was with regard to the
determination of the nature of the sanction to be imposed, as well as deciding upon whom the
sanction should be imposed. See FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note to 1983
amendments ("[The court] has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case,
with which it should be well acquainted."); see also Vairo, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 22, at
194. 31See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments ("The text of
the... rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that efforts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by
insuring that the rule will be applied when properly invoked.'); Vairo, CriticalAnalysis, supra
note 22, at 193.
39See Cochran, supra note 26, at 14 (observing that some viewed Rule 11 "as a weapon of
'warfare,' to be employed as part of 'hard ball' litigation techniques"); Mark S. Stein, Rule 11
in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the Purpose of Imposing Attorney
Fee Sanctions for the Assertion ofFrivolous LegalArguments, 132 F.R.D. 309, 309 (noting the
presence of incentives in litigation "to threaten or seek sanctions against legal arguments that
are not frivolous, but dangerous"); Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Reject Revision to Rule
11, 160 F.R.D. 275, 276-77 (1995) (noting the tactical use of Rule 11 "such as [to] threaten[ ]
less powerful parties") [hereinafter Tobias, Why Congress]; Vairo, Critical Analysis, supra note
22, at 195-96 (noting that lawyers routinely abused Rule I 1 to force adversaries to justify their
positions and as a discovery device); Weston, supra note 32, at 899 (observing that attorney
sanctions are used as a weapon insofar as "[l]awyers threaten one another to force or prevent
specific conduct"); Wilkins, supra note 1, at 838 (noting that Rule 11 provides adversaries with
the opportunity to "gain a number of strategic advantages from reporting lawyer misconduct").40 See Cochran, supra note 26, at 15; Grosberg, supra note 26, at 647-49; Keeling, supra
note 13, at 1080-81; William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013,
1017-18 (1988) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Revisited]; Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 20, at
172; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision ofRule 11, 77 IoWA L. REV.
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and June 1993, approximately 7,000 judicial opinions referencing Rule 11 were
reported,41 as compared to the less than twenty-five that were published under the
1938 version.42 Furthermore, there is ample evidence to suggest that plaintiffs,
and civil rights plaintiffs in particular, were far more likely than defendants to be
the targets of Rule 11 motions and the recipients of sanctions.43 The resultant
1775, 1776 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs]; Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule
11, 46 MIAMI L. REV. 855, 860 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Reconsidering]; Vairo, Critical
Analysis, supra note 22, at 199; Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 598-99; Lawyers'
Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1638-39. See generally WILLGING, supra note 29, at 107-23.
One notable commentator has defined "satellite litigation" as "ancillary proceedings that may
otherwise assume the dimensions of litigation with a life of its own." Schwarzer, Sanctions,
supra note 11, at 183.41 See Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 626. These large numbers are likely but the "tip of
the iceberg," as the vast majority of decisions concerning Rule 11 are not published. See
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1955-56 (1989).42 See, e.g., Keeling, supra note 13, at 1075; Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil
Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 157
(1999); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication
of Rule 11 by Harmonizing t with Pre- Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 257,
257 (1991).43See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN
TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11 65 (1989) [hereinafter RULE 11 IN TRANSITION]; KASSIN, supra note 32, at 38;
ELIZABETH WIGGINS Er AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 1B (1991) [hereinafter FJC FINAL REPORT]; Burbank, supra note 41, at 1937-38; Marshall et
al., supra note 32, at 952-53; Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some
Chilling Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313,
1327, 1340 (1986) [hereinafter Nelken, Sanctions]; Attachment B to Letter from Hon. Sam C.
Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Hon. Robert E. Keeton,
Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3 (May 1, 1992), reprinted
in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523 (1993) [hereinafter Pointer Letter, Attachment B]; Morton Stavis, Rule
11: Which is Worse- The Problem or the Cure?, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 606-08
(1992); Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 40, at 1776-77; Vairo, Critical Analysis,
supra note 22, at 200-01. But see Spiegel, supra note 42, at 176-77 (acknowledging criticism
that possible over-inclusiveness of the definition of "civil rights" cases may have resulted in a
misperception or exaggeration of the true impact on "traditional" civil rights cases); Tobias,
1993 Revision, supra note 20, at 181 (noting that the advisory committee's April 1992 interim
report on the proposed 1993 amendments "found insufficient evidence that the [1983
version] ... had a chilling effect on civil rights litigants"); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note
40, at 860 (noting a decline in 1988 and thereafter with regard to Rule 11 sanctions against civil
rights plaintiffs). See generally Spiegel, supra note 42, at 168-80; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11:
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 483-86 (1991)
[hereinafter Vairo, Where We Are]. It should also be noted that some commentators have
offered as an explanation or justification for the disparate impact of Rule 11 sanctions on civil
rights plaintiffs that such "cases are more likely to be frivolous than others." Spiegel, supra note
42, at 191-92 (discussing comments made by Judge William 0. Bertlesman during 1991 public
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effect was a widely held view that Rule 11 was "chilling" legitimate creative
advocacy.44 Moreover, commentators and critics observed various other serious
problems under the 1983 version, including the following: (1) courts rarely
imposed non-monetary sanctions for violations; (2) there was no incentive for
parties to abandon claims or contentions discovered to be lacking a legal or
factual basis; (3) counsel were more antagonistic towards one another;, and (4)
relations between attorney and client were, at times, strained.45
Thus, the 1983 solution to the problems associated with the 1938 edition of
Rule 11 actually made matters worse in many respects. While the 1938 version
allowed most litigation misconduct to slip through the cracks, the 1983 Rule 11
arguably went too far in the opposite direction. In fact, although the latter version
may have reduced the incidences of frivolous filings, it also permitted lawyers to
engage in another type of litigation abuse alluded to earlier-the offensive use of
Rule 11 as a litigation weapon.46 Indeed, this form of illegitimate advocacy could
potentially do more harm to the legal process than the filing of frivolous
pleadings.47 Further change was accordingly deemed necessary.
48
hearing regarding amending the 1983 version of Rule 11 and explanations contained in the FJC
Final Report).
44See Marshall et al., supra note 32, at 961 (observing that 19.3% of respondents to Rule
11 survey reported that within the past year--prior to 1992-they had declined to present a
claim or defense despite believing said claim or defense to have merit); see also Melissa L.
Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule
11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J 383, 393-94 (1990) [hereinafter Nelken, Looking for Middle
Ground]; Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 43, at 1343-44; Stavis, supra note 43, at 607-08;
Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 40, at 1777; Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 43, at
483-86. For a general empirical discussion regarding the perceived chilling effect of the 1983
version of Rule 11, see WLLGING, supra note 29, at 157-68. But see RULE 11 IN TRANSrTION,
supra note 43, at 69 (expressing doubt regarding the need for concern in connection with the so-
called "chilling" effect of Rule 11 in the Third Circuit); FJC FINAL REPORT, supra note 43,
§ 2A, at 8 (noting that 95% of the judges surveyed did not believe that the 1983 version of Rule
I 1 impeded the development of the law); Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 36 (discussing
lack of clarity regarding the "chilling argument"); Schwarzer, supra note 40, at 1017
(expressing doubt as to the reality of Rule 11 actually chilling advocacy).45See FJC FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, § 1A, at 2; see also Nelken, Sanctions, supra
note 43, at 1343-44 (noting that a lawyer's self interest in avoiding sanctions "may lead to an
overly conservative view of the merits of a client's case"); Pointer Letter, Attachment B, supra
note 43, at 3, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 523; Stein, supra note 39, at 330 (observing that Rule
11 is a "form of escalation, a cutthroat tactic in the struggle over the merits"); Vairo, Rule 11,
supra note 26, at 590, 627, 628 (noting that the 1983 version of Rule 11 seemed to increase
contentiousness and hostility between counsel).46 See supra note 39.
47 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.48Despite the decision to amend Rule 11, it is significant to note that a survey of judges
revealed that 80% of them considered the overall effect of the 1983 version of the rule to have
been positive, notwithstanding the negative observations noted above. See FJC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 43, § 2A, at 18. It should also be noted that it was the perception of a large majority
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After a rather lengthy pre-enactment debate,49 the current version of Rule 11
took effect on December 1, 1993.50 Unlike its previous incarnation, this Rule 11
of the judges surveyed that groundless litigation was not a very big problem. See id., § 2A, at 2.
This finding, however, does not necessarily support the argument that groundless litigation is
not prevalent. It simply suggests that many of the judges polled do not deem such litigation to
be a major concem, which could be read to mean that these judges consider it tolerable.
Another explanation could be that groundless positions that were being taken in litigation were
rarely brought to the attention of the trial judge. Although a large percentage of the judges
estimated that not "many" groundless papers were filed in their courts over a twelve month
span, the approximations made do not appear to have been well-grounded empirically. See id.
§ 2A, at3.
49 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules received various requests for amendment of the
1983 version of Rule 11. In addition, assorted studies regarding the effects (mostly negative) of
the 1983 version had been conducted. See Pointer Letter, Attachment B, supra note 43, at 2,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 522. Based on the tide of criticism and the apparent desire amongst
the bar to make some change to Rule 11, the Committee solicited comments about different
aspects of the rule and enlisted the Federal Judicial Center to conduct studies and surveys of its
own. See id. A public meeting was subsequently held, at which the Committee heard from
various authorities on Rule 11. Id. Varying views were expressed regarding whether and how
Rule 11 should be altered, but the Committee ultimately determined that, "though frequently
exaggerated or premised on faulty assumptions," much of the criticism of Rule 11 had some
merit. Id. at 3. As a result, the Committee drafted a proposed amendment that it published in
August of 1991. See id. The Committee then received substantial public comment regarding the
proposed amendment, and in the end, unanimously recommended adoption of the changes as
originally constituted, with a few technical alterations. See id. The Supreme Court approved the
amendment over the stinging dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas. See Supreme Court of the
United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 501-13
(1993).
5 The 1993 version of Rule 11 reads as follows:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's
address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by
rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit An unsigned
paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, -
(I) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
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(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the
party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and
employees.
(B) On the Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court
may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to
violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to
show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect
thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of
a nonronetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a
voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against
the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
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made the "presentation" of an offending paper to the court, rather than the mere
signing thereof,5' the triggering event for a violation and made the imposition of
sanctions discretionary.5 2 In addition, the drafters revised the factual certification
burden by permitting attorneys to plead allegations based upon information and
belief so long as they represent that the allegations are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.53 The Advisory Committee
emphasized, however, that "if evidentiary support is not obtained after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the party has a duty
under the Rule not to persist with that contention.
54
The 1993 version also changed the legal certification requirement. Under the
1983 version, an attorney's signature certified that the attorney had read the
"pleading, motion or other paper" and that "to the best of [his or her] knowledge,
information and belief," the paper was "well grounded in fact and [was]
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law .... ss The current rule significantly
altered this standard by providing that a lawyer's certification represents that the
filing in question is "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law.,5 6 Furthermore, the certification requirement is now applicable to each
claim, defense, or legal contention contained within a pleading, rather than to the
pleading as a whole-an important point that was not clear under the 1983
version.
57
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply
to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to
the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.51 Under the rule, "presentation" includes "signing, filing, submitting or later advocating."
FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (b). The 1983 version only referred to "signing." See supra note 35.52 FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c) ("[T]he court may... impose an appropriate sanction .... )
(emphasis added).53FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(b)(3) and advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments. In
addition, the rule now acknowledges that denials of factual allegations may be "reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief' so long as they are "specifically so identified." FED. 1L
Civ. P. 11 (b)(4). None of this was possible under the 1983 version.
54 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments.55FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (emphasis added). For the entire text of the 1983 version, see
supra note 35.
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2) (emphasis added).57 See id.; Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 14-15 ("The certification.., clearly runs
separately to each of the claims, defenses and contentions, not only to the paper as a whole.').
Compare Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Federation, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Rule 11 applies to all statements in papers it covers. Each claim must have sufficient support;
each must be investigated and researched before filing.") with Golden Eagle Distributing Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the 1983 version of Rule
11 "permit[ted] the imposition of sanctions only when the 'pleading, motion, or other paper'
[Vol. 62:15551572
ENDING ILLEGITIMATE AD VOCA CY
The most unique and important change to the rule, however, was the adoption
of a so-called "safe harbor" provision.58 This portion of the rule precludes a party
from simply filing a Rule 11 motion against an adversary when there is a belief
that a violation has occurred. Instead, the "movant" must first serve the motion, 9
in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5,60 and then wait twenty-one
days.61 During that twenty-one day period, the alleged Rule 11 offender may
withdraw or correct the challenged "paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation,
or denial" without any fear of sanctions under Rule 11.62 The movant may only
itself [was] frivolous, not when one of the arguments in support of a pleading or motion [was]
frivolous").51FED. R. CIV. P. 1 I(c)(1)(A); see also Keeling, supra note 13, at 1091; Vairo, Where We
Are, supra note 43, at 498.59 The 1993 version of Rule 11 requires that a motion for sanctions thereunder may only be
initiated by way of a separate motion that specifically sets forth the conduct that allegedly
violates the rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). This added requirement was no doubt
intended to discourage somewhat the pursuit of Rule 11 sanctions. See Tobias, 1993 Revision,
supra note 20, at 207 (noting that the separate motion requirement was at least in part "intended
to make pursuit of sanctions more onerous, thereby reducing Rule 11 activity");Vairo, Where
We Are, supra note 43, at 498 (observing that separate motion requirement was, in part,
"intended to reduce the... practice of making threats or sending vague 'Rule 11 letters' to bully
an opponent into withdrawing a paper or position"); accord Georgene M. Vairo, he New Rule
11: Past as Prologue?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 39, 63 (1994) [hereinafter Vairo, Past as
Prologue].
The pertinent part of Rule 5 provides that:
Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attomey unless service upon
the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made
by delivering a copy to the attorney or party or by mailing it to the attorney or party at the
attorney's or party's last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the
clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy within this rule means: handing it to the attorney or to
the party;, or leaving it at the attorney's or party's office with a clerk or other person in
charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or,
if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.
FED. R. Crv. P. 5(b).61 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(1)(A).
62See id; see also Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 396; Keeling, supra note 13, at 1091-92;
Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The Transformation of the Venomous
Viper into the Toothless Tiger, 29 TORT & INs. L.J. 497, 502-03 (1994). It should be noted,
however, that Professor Jeffrey Pamess has argued that "correction or withdrawal of Rule 11
violations will not absolutely protect attorneys against all sanctions for conduct preceding a
notice of [challenge]." Parness, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 45. Specifically,
Professor Parness reads the safe harbor provision as only insulating violators from potential
monetary sanctions. Jeffrey A. Pamess, The New Federal Rule 11: Different Sanctions, Second
Thoughts, 83 ILL. B.J. 126, 128 (1995) [hereinafter Pamess, Different Sanctions] ('The new
Rule 11 allows court initiatives and public interest sanctions on all rule violations, whether or
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file the motion with the court if the non-movant fails to take any action during the
twenty-one day safe harbor period.63
These dramatic changes to Rule 1164 were clearly intended to respond to
problems and complaints associated with the 1983 version and, specifically,
reduce the excessive use and abuse of the rule and lessen the perceived chilling
effect on certain categories of litigants.5 In the midst of all the revisions,
however, the one aspect of Rule 11 that remained unchanged was the rule's
ultimate goal of deterrence. 66 Indeed, if anything, the drafters sought to emphasize
and enhance this one Rule 11 constant. 67
not corrected during any safe harbor period.") (citing advisory committee notes to 1993
amendments of Rule 11(c)); Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 45; accord
Stavis, supra note 43, at609 (noting that the "'safe harbor' provision does not prevent a court
from initiating sanctions, but in that case it may not impose monetary sanctions if the violating
party voluntarily dismissed its action or settled the case"). While Professor Pamess's
interpretation seems textually plausible, the only way that a court could exercise its authority to
impose a non-monetary Rule 11 sanction would be if it were aware that an attomey had
withdrawn or corrected an offending paper pursuant to the safe harbor provision. There is,
however, very little, if any, likelihood that a court will ever learn about such a correction or
withdrawal unless non-offending counsel apprises the court. See Parness, Disciplinary
Referrals, supra note 24, at 45 (acknowledging that "trial judges may have difficulty learning
about some of the very rule violations they might wish to sanction in the public interest"); see
also infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. Requiring or expecting counsel to do this
would seriously undermine one major rationale behind the safe harbor provision---reducing the
burden on courts in dealing with the high volume of Rule 11 motions. See infra notes 84, 103
and accompanying text.
63See FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (c)(1)(A).
64 Other changes to Rule 11 included: (1) the requirement that the imposition of sanctions
be preceded by "notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard" (Rule 11 (c)); (2) emphasis on
the fact that an attorney's law firm should typically be held jointly responsible for violations
committed by the attorney (Rule I I(c)(1)(A)); (3) prohibition against imposition of monetary
sanctions on a represented party for the presentation of a frivolous legal argument (Rule
I 1(c)(2)(A)); and (4) making Rule 11 wholly inapplicable to discovery (Rule 11 (d)).6 5See, e.g., Keeling, supra note 13, at 1153 (observing that "1993 amendments attempt to
lessen the chilling effect of the rule with various procedural devices," including the safe harbor
provision); Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 12 (noting that the "overriding purpose of
the 1993 amendments was ... to remedy problems perceived to have arisen in the interpretation
of the 1983 [version]"); Tobias, Why Congress, supra note 39, at 277 (noting that the "rule
revisers meant to reduce Rule lI's invocation and concomitant satellite litigation by decreasing
incentives to rely on Rule 11").66See Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 400 (observing that "deterrence is the principal goal of
the sanctioning process" under the 1993 version of Rule 11); Pointer Letter, Attachment B,
supra note 43, at 3, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 523 ('The goal of the 1983 version remains a
proper and legitimate one, and its insistence that litigants 'stop-and-think' before filing
pleadings, motions, and other papers should, in the opinion of the Committee, be retained.);
Ripps and Drowatzky, supra note 26, at 78-79 (noting that the 1993 "changes did not alter the
Rule's purpose of preventing litigation abuses"); Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 20, at 184
(noting the advisory committee's intention to "emphasize... that the Rule's principal purpose
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The most obvious evidence of this was the shift in the sanctioning focus of
the rule from an emphasis on the award of attorneys' fees as the sanction of
choice63 to the encouragement of sanctions designed to deter the filing of
frivolous or abusive claims.69 The rule now specifically provides that:
A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated... [T]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
70
The Advisory Committee also observed that "[s]ince the purpose of Rule 11
sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a
was to deter litigation abuse"). But see Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 619 (observing that
"although the 1993 amendments ... made clear that the purpose of Rule 11 is purely
deterrence, there continues to be broad support among the bench and bar for Rule 11 to
incorporate a compensatory as well as a deterrent purpose").
'The Advisory Committee noted that it drafted the proposed amendment to the rule "with
the objective of increasing the fairness and effectiveness of the rule as a means to deter
presentation and maintenance of frivolous positions, while also reducing the frequency of Rule
11 motions." Pointer Letter, Attachment B, supra note 43, at 3, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 523;
see also infra text accompanying note 71. Although courts have no doubt attributed various
purposes to Rule 11, it cannot be disputed that the primary intent underlying the rule has always
been to deter abusive litigation conduct generally. See Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 619
(noting that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 clarified that the "purpose of Rule 11 is purely
deterrence"); see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 498 U.S. 533,
553 (1991) (noting that "[tihe main objective of [Rule 11] is not to reward parties who are
victimized by litigation; it is to deter baseless filings and curb abuses"); Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,393 (1990) (noting that any interpretation of Rule 11 "must give
effect to the Rule's central goal of deterrence"), superceded by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993);
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Enter. Group, 493 U.S. 120, 130 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that Rule 11 was "explicitly designed to deter improper pleadings, motions, and
papers'), superseded by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993); Vairo, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 22, at
203-04.68 Under the 1983 version of Rule 11, an award of attorneys' fees or other monetary
penalty was clearly the most frequent sanction imposed. See RuLE 11 IN TRANSmON, supra
note 43, at 36-37; Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 389, 401; Keeling, supra note 13, at 1082;
Vairo, Critical Analysis, supra note 22, at 227; Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 619; see also
Marshall et al., supra note 32, at 956-57 (observing that although monetary sanctions were
ovenvhelmingly the most frequent, the amount of those awards did not seem to be as large as
Rule I I publicity might suggest). See generally WILLGNG, supra note 29, at 125-40.
69See Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 22 ("The revision is consistent with the
emphasis of the [1993] amendment[s] on furthering professional behavior as opposed to
sanctioning misbehavior."); see also Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 396.70FED. R. CIV. P. I l(C)(2).
2001] 1575
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a
penalty."7' The Committee apparently wanted courts to resort to awarding
attorneys' fees in only rare instances.72 In fact, the Committee went so far as to
list various types of sanctions that it deemed more appropriate to further the
central deterrence purpose of the rule, including such "disciplinary-type"
sanctions as: "issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring
participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to
the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities.
' '73
This focus on deterrence, however, while appropriate, is ironically
inconsistent with the presence of a "safe harbor" provision in the rule, which
allows litigation misconduct to go unpunished and undeterred in exchange for a
reduction in the volume of Rule 11 motions.74 This dissonance is difficult to
reconcile, and to paraphrase Justice Scalia, seems to take the teeth out of Rule
11.7 5
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments (emphasis added).
72 See id (noting that "under unusual circumstances" it may be necessary to "direct[ ] that
some or all of a [monetary sanction] be [paid] to those injured by the violation") (emphasis
added); see also JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11 146-47 (1999).73 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments; see also WILLGING,
supra note 29, at 137 (noting study findings that disciplinary referrals were rarely used as
substitute for Rule 11 sanctions); Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48
Am. U. L. REv. 1007, 1040-41 (1999) (noting that only a few courts have exercised the option
of referring attorneys to state disciplinary bodies as a Rule 11 sanction). It should also be noted
that under the 1993 version, a court imposing sanctions must "describe the conduct determined
to constitute a violation... and explain the basis for the sanction imposed." FED. R. Civ. P.
I l(c)(3); see Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 631-42.74See, e.g., Leiferman, supra note 62, at 503 (noting that safe harbor provision is
"antithetical to the fundamental deterrence objective of Rule 11"). But see JOSEPH, supra note
30, at 314 (also noting potential for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the courts' inherent
powers); Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 399-400 (noting that even those who withdraw or correct
a claim within the safe harbor period are still potentially subject to sanctions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent powers of the court); Pamess, Different Sanctions, supra note
62, at 128 (noting that the 1993 version of Rule 11 promotes deterrence insofar as it even allows
for "sanctions against those whose frivolity is short-lived, and perhaps caused little harm to
opponents and to the judicial system"). For a brief discussion of why other federal sanction
possibilities are not viable alternatives to Rule 11, see infra notes 114-20 and accompanying
notes.75 See Leiferman, supra note 62, at 503 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent regarding the
1993 amendments); see also Dissenting Statement of Scalia, J., Supreme Court of the United
States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 (Apr. 2, 1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 507, 507 (1993) [hereinafter Scalia Dissent]. Justice Scalia specifically noted that:
"Under the revised Rule, parties will be able to file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing
pleadings, secure in the knowledge that they have nothing to lose: If objection is raised, they
can retreat without penalty." Id. at 2, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 507-08 (1993). But see
Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 399-400; Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 45;
Parness Different Sanctions, supra note 62, at 128.
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B. The Discord Created by the "Safe Harbor" Provision
Under the 1983 version of Rule 11 and the pertinent case law, once an
attorney discovered that his or her position was "frivolous," there was very little
incentive to dismiss or withdraw the pleading.76 Specifically, the Supreme Court
announced in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Cop.,77 that voluntary dismissal of a
baseless claim did not divest a district court of jurisdiction to consider a potential
Rule 11 violation.78 Hence, a lawyer who knew or was fearful that a challenged
claim or contention lacked legal or factual merit would have been unwise to
withdraw the pleading voluntarily, because withdrawal could have been
interpreted as an admission and would have increased the probability for a
successful Rule 11 motion.79 Moreover, even if opposing counsel declined to file
a Rule 11 motion, the risk remained that the court might impose sanctions sua
sponte for a violation. 0 Consequently, under the 1983 version, it behooved an
attorney to maintain his or her questionable pleading and roll the dice.8 '
76 See Pointer Letter, Attachment B, supra note 43, at 3, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 523
(noting that the 1983 version of Rule 11 "provide[d] little incentive, and perhaps a disincentive,
for a party to abandon positions after determining they are no longer supportable") (emphasis
added); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments ("Under
the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that
be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule I I ."); Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra note 59,
at 70-71.
77496 U.S. 384 (1990), superceded by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993).
71Id. at 398.79See supra note 76; Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 395 (observing that under the 1983
version "the very act of voluntary dismissal [could] be used as evidence that the claim was
baseless"); Lawyers 'Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1640 (noting reluctance to correct claims
under the 1983 version because such correction could be viewed as an admission of liability).
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose... an
appropriate sanction .... ) (emphasis added).1 As noted earlier, at least one commentator, Professor Charles Yablon, has posited that
there is no such thing as a frivolous lawsuit. According to him, what the legal profession
typically labels as a "frivolous" or "baseless" action is really a lawsuit with a low probability of
success. See Yablon, supra note 20, at 67. It appears to be Professor Yablon's position that very
few individuals, if any, are foolish enough to file an action or maintain a position that has zero
probability of success. Thus, according to him, the types of cases that are on the receiving end
of Rule 11 sanctions are actually cases with a low probability of success. See id.
Somewhat consistent with Professor Yablon's observation, Professor Maureen Armour
has noted that courts do in fact impose Rule 11 sanctions in "close cases," not just the obviously
frivolous or "easy' ones. See Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and
the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493 (1997); see also Lawyers'
Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1649-50 (noting evidence of strong potential for judges to
disagree over what constitutes a frivolous case such as to warrant Rule 11 sanctions). If the
decision regarding whether a given claim or contention is frivolous is difficult or a "close call,"
then logic seems to suggest that the claim or contention is not in fact frivolous. See Armour,
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Among other reasons, the "safe harbor" provision was added to Rule 11 to
eliminate the rule's disincentive toward withdrawal of frivolous claims.2 An
attorney can now dismiss, withdraw, or correct a claim or position with virtually
no fear of being hit with a Rule 11 sanction. This has the positive effect of
potentially reducing the number of Rule 11 motions actually filed, which in turn
decreases the amount of satellite litigation generated by the rule. 4
supra at 553-54, 555 (questioning the logic and efficacy of imposing Rule 11 sanctions in cases
where determining the existence of a violation is a close call); cf Stempel, supra note 42, at 261
(proposing institution of a "safe harbor" presumption against Rule 11 sanctions when a claim
survives pre-verdict dismissal). These difficult or close decisions are not the sort of cases that
are the scourge of the legal profession, and hence, are not the ones that this article's proposal is
designed to address.
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments; see also Cavanagh,
supra note 32, at 395 (noting that the 1983 version, as interpreted in Cooter & Gell, provided a
"strong disincentive to offending parties to discontinue actions on their own motion"); Keeling,
supra note 13, at 1091-92 (noting that a purpose of the "safe harbor" provision was to reduce
the "chilling" effect of Rule 11 "by insulating litigants from sanctions for correctable
mistakes"); Leiferman, supra note 62, at 503 (observing that the safe harbor provision was
added to the 1993 version of Rule 11 "to eliminate the fear that withdrawal of an untenable
position would subject a party to Rule 11 sanctions"). But see Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra
note 59, at 64-65 (articulating belief that the "safe harbor" provision may serve only to push
back the point at which chilling occurs rather than actually reduce the potential chilling effect of
Rule 11); Lawyers Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1644-46 (observing that various aspects of
the 1993 version of Rule 11 may actually increase the "chilling" effect previously associated
with Rule 11).83 See Scalia Dissent, supra note 75, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 508. But see Parness,
Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 45; Pamess, Different Sanctions, supra note 62, at 128.
As Professor Parness has observed, there appears to be at least a possibility that non-monetary
sanctions can be imposed by a trial court, even after an offending paper has been dismissed,
withdrawn, or corrected. See id. Nevertheless, the likelihood of this happening seems far too
remote to be of much, if any, concern to lawyers or litigants. See infra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text.
8 As Judge Schwarzer has noted:
By inducing, if not compelling, opposing lawyers to communicate with each other,
[the safe harbor] provision also furthers the aims of Rule 1 [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure], as the amendments intend. It reflects a widely held view that much costly and
time-consuming litigation activity could be avoided if lawyers talked to each other before
they acted.
Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 20; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's
note to 1993 amendments; JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 314; Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra note
59, at 71; Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1641. A 1995 survey of judges and
attorneys revealed that the majority of judges polled believed that Rule 11 activity under the
1993 version had either remained the same (37%) or decreased (39%). See JOHN SHAPARD Er
AL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 FJC REPORT]; see also infra note 103. It
should also be noted that the survey indicated that 70% of the judges and 69% of the lawyers
polled either moderately or strongly supported the safe harbor provision. See id.
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The problem, though, is that the drafters removed the "withdrawal
disincentive" from Rule 11 by replacing it with an incentive to be careless,
reckless, or maybe even willful with regard to the assertion of questionable claims
or positions.8s As noted, under the 1983 version, a lawyer was wise to maintain a
claim or position, once asserted, and gamble on whatever probability of success
there might be. 6 Under the 1993 version, however, a lawyer can play the odds at
the pleading or filing stage, and if opposing counsel "calls" him or her on a shaky
claim or contention, the attorney can simply dismiss or withdraw it. 7 As a result,
the safe harbor provision eviscerates any deterrent component that Rule 11 may
have had,"8 and it actually penalizes the diligent attorney who expends the time,
85lndeed, the Court in Cooter & Gell v. Harnmarx Corp., predicted as much, noting that
"[i]f a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11 merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose
all incentive to 'stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers."'
496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990) (quoting Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D.
165, 192 (1983) (Letter from Judge Walter Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, and Members of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure) (Mar. 9, 1982)); see also Howard A. Cutler, Comment, A
Practitioner's Guide to the 1993 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP.
L. REV. 265, 267, 287-88 (1994) (noting potential for safe harbor provision to foster abusive or
harassing litigation tactics). But see supra note 62 (discussing the possibility that a court may
impose non-monetary sanctions notwithstanding withdrawal or correction under the safe harbor
provision).
Another commentator has aptly noted that without an adequate system for enforcing
penalties for litigation abuse, lawyers are much more likely to view the litigation process in a
"gaming" fashion:
Absent a significant threat of enforcement, the desire to win for one's client is likely
to influence strategic choices about what moves to take and whether to risk rule
infractions. Lawyers will not adequately screen out implausible contentions or refrain from
unreasonably contentious behavior unless a system exists for enforcing articulated
standards.
Maute, supra note 12, at 48; cf. Molot, supra note 17, at 994-1005 (discussing how general
changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide incentives for attomeys to pursue weak
positions).
86 See, e.g., Yablon, supra note 20; see also supra note 81.87See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(A); see also Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra note 4, at
1641 (noting that the safe harbor provision may encourage parties to "argue everything
imaginable').8 One commentator vividly demonstrated the serious detrimental impact that the safe
harbor provision could potentially have on the deterrence objective of Rule 11 by way of an
analogy to the criminal justice system:
[I]f the criminal justice system allowed a thief to avoid prosecution by returning
stolen property within twenty-one days after apprehension, it seems improbable that a
threatened jail sentence would deter future thefts. Rather, just as the early parole system
spurred recidivism, the "safe harbor" provision of new Rule 11 may encourage litigants to
plead claims and name parties without adequate factual or legal inquiry and run the
unforbidding risk of having to withdraw the contention under challenge.
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effort, and money to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion that, though effective, in
the end amounts to little more than an expensive secret threat.89
Nonetheless, one can argue that the safe harbor provision encourages
creativity and protects those who file novel claims or claims that are well
founded, but that initially lack evidentiary support.90 Such an argument, however,
is neither logical nor consistent with the drafters' actual intent.91 Indeed, nothing
in the advisory committee's notes to the 1993 amendments suggests that the safe
harbor provision was intended to encourage creativity among the bar.92
Furthermore, creative but supportable claims are already permitted. Rule 11
expressly provides that its dictates are not violated when one asserts a contention
that is supported by a "nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law."93 An attorney who
believes this to be the case with respect to a particular claim or contention would
Leiferman, supra note 62, at 503; see also Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398; Scalia Dissent,
supra note 75, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 508; Lawyers Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1641
(noting that the "perverse incentives" created by the safe harbor provision may undermine the
provision's benefits). But see Pamess, Different Sanctions, supra note 62, at 128.
89See FED. R. C1v. P. 1 1(c)(1)(A); see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.9, at 27-
20 (noting that the safe harbor provision may tempt ' Rambo" lawyers to "file a series of
frivolous papers, put the other side to the trouble and expense of preparing a motion, and then
withdraw the paper on the twentieth day"); Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 399 (observing that the
"good guy foots the bill and the bad guy walks away scot-free"); Hirt, supra note 73, at 1023
(noting potential for counsel to abuse the safe harbor provision by pursuing frivolous positions
and then withdrawing them, "thereby wasting the opponents' time and diverting them from
other litigation tasksl). The advisory committee notes indicate that counsel should typically
"give informal notice to the other party, whether in person or by telephone call or letter, of a
potential violation before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion." FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments. Personal experience and common sense,
however, suggest that this "informal notification" may have little impact given that only the
actual service of a formal motion can trigger the running of the twenty-one day safe harbor
period. See id. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be acknowledged that attorneys may also
utilize the 1993 version of Rule 11 offensively as a litigation weapon by threatening Rule 11
motions even when not wan-anted. Such lawyers will likely invest little time in the preparation
of their "threat," while the recipient thereof may "withdraw" or "dismiss" out of fear, or may
expend unnecessary time and money in investigating and responding to the threat. See Tobias,
Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 40, at 1785 (noting that lawyers may use Rule 11 offensively
to put opposing counsel to unnecessary expense through a "threat and retreat" strategy); see
also Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 20, at 207-08, 212; Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note
40, at 876-77; Cutler, supra note 85, at 288.90See Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 40, at 1784-85; Tobias, 1993 Revision,
supra note 20, at 207; Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 40, at 876; Vairo, Rule 11, supra note
26, at 643; see also Nelken, Lookingfor Middle Ground, supra note 44, at 404-05.
91See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments. If
anything, the provision appears to have been designed to insulate those who make mistakes in
connection with their court-filed papers. See, e.g., Keeling, supra note 13, at 1091-93.92See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments.
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(2).
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in all likelihood assert and maintain such position even in the absence of the safe
harbor provision.
94
Moreover, other revisions to Rule 11 alleviate what was perceived as the
rule's disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs. 95 Under the 1983 version,
both the fact that sanctions were mandatory and that there was a significant risk
that a large attorney fee award would be the sanction of choice96 were believed to
have had a stifling effect on the filing of legitimate civil rights claims.97 The 1993
version of Rule 11 has dramatically altered the calculus for deciding whether or
not to file such claims. Under the current rule, sanctions are no longer
mandatory;98 the potential for a large attorney fee award if a Rule 11 violation is
found has been virtually eliminated;99 and civil rights plaintiffs who believe that
they have a legitimate claim, but lack sufficient supporting evidence at the
pleading stage of a case, are now expressly permitted to plead based upon
information and belief-so long as they indicate that the claims are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. 00 In light of
these changes, irrespective of the safe harbor provision, litigants who possess
potentially meritorious claims should be more apt to pursue them.
Who then does the safe harbor provision protect? For the most part, it
protects the careless, the incompetent and the ill-intentioned.' 0 ' The only one of
these three categories arguably deserving of some protection is "the careless,"'
0 2
94It must be acknowledged, however, that to the extent that a stiff penalty is a viable
possibility, even a lawyer who feels strongly about his or her novel legal position may "cave" in
the face of a Rule 11 threat. This was certainly the case under the 1983 version, and to a much
more limited extent, it no doubt remains a possible reaction under the 1993 version. See, e.g.,
Marshall et al., supra note 32, at 960-61 (noting that knowledge of potential for sanctions under
the 1983 version of Rule 11 significantly impacted the pre-filing behavior of attorneys); Nelken,
Looking for Middle Ground, supra note 44, at 393-99 (discussing the chilling effect created as
a result of the imposition of significant monetary sanctions under the 1983 version of Rule 11).95See, e.g., Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 40, at 1791 (noting that various
changes to Rule 11 should decrease the chilling aspect of the rule).See supra note 68 and accompanying text.97 See supra notes 43-44.
"
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c).
99Seesupra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
'°°See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)(3). But see Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 20, at 203
(noting that in connection with the opportunity to plead on "information and belief," plaintiffs
may have problems recognizing which contentions will have evidentiary support, as well as
what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity" for discovery).
101 Cf Schwarzer, Sanctions, supra note 11, at 201 (noting with regard to the 1983 version
of Rule 11 that violations thereof may be attributed to "inexperience, incompetence, neglect,
wilfulness or deliberate choice"). Judge Schwarzer has also correctly observed that the level of
punishment and deterrence necessary should vary depending upon the cause of the violation. Id.
102 See Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra note 59, at 64 ("A litigant who has made a mistake
should have the opportunity to withdraw a paper without suffering sanctions."); accord Vairo,
Where We Are, supra note 43, at 498; see also Schwarzer, Sanctions, supra note 11, at 201
(suggesting that lesser punishment and less need for deterrence may be called for under Rule 11
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unless the carelessness is recurrent, which then suggests incompetence. Although
there do not appear to be statistics showing why attorneys utilize the safe harbor
provision, it seems reasonable to speculate that the overwhelming majority of
those who do take advantage of the provision fall into one of the aforementioned
categories-at least two of which are completely unworthy of any protection.
Given this likelihood, the obvious question is: why retain the safe harbor
provision? The most reasonable explanation is to prevent federal judges from
having to waste valuable time addressing unmeritorious claims and defenses filed
by these three categories of attorneys, either through the actual granting of Rule
11 motions or by way of rulings on dispositive motions. 10 3 This judicial economy
explanation is not only plausible, but also makes a powerful case for the
continued existence of the safe harbor provision. Nevertheless, some
commentators have suggested that the safe harbor provision be eliminated. 104
They seem to agree with Justice Scalia that the presence of a "safe harbor" simply
encourages carelessness and abuse in the pleading process and therefore is of little
value.'0 5 The position of these "safe harbor" critics, however, likely stems from
the impulse to focus solely on the inconsistency between the safe harbor provision
and Rule I l's goal of deterrence. Such a perspective fails to acknowledge fully
depending upon the nature of the cause of the violation). But see SOLOVY, supra note 72, at 176
(noting that some courts have held that inexperience is no excuse for a Rule 11 violation).
3 See JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 314 (noting that the safe harbor provision should reduce
"Rule 11 volume while accomplishing the goal of the Rule-streamlining litigation by
eliminating papers and contentions proscribed by the Rule-without burdening the Court");
1995 FJC REPORT, supra note 84, at 4 (discussing some evidence that the safe harbor provision
had reduced the amount of Rule 11 activity); Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 401 (observing that
"the safe harbor provision can be viewed as enhancing judicial efficiency"); Laura Duncan,
Sanctions Litigation Declining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 12 (noting marked decrease in reported
cases under the 1993 version as a likely by-product of the safe harbor provision); Vairo, Past as
Prologue, supra note 59, at 64 (noting that the safe harbor provision "serves the streamlining
purpose that the 1983 architects of Rule 11 originally envisioned"); see also Lawyers'
Responsibilities, supra note 4, at 1641. Other potential benefits include the elimination of the
need for the "accused to prepare responding papers," and the avoidance of delay in dealing with
the merits of a case. Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 401.
1°4See, e.g., Ripps & Drowatzky, supra note 26, at 89. Indeed, in 1995, legislation was
proposed in the United States House of Representatives that would have modified the 1993
version of Rule 11 by eliminating the safe harbor provision, among other things. This
legislation, which was a section of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, was passed by the
House, but never taken up by the Senate. See Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Note, Sanctions
for Nonfrivolous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the Improper
Purpose Prong of Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1359, 1371 (1998). For a discussion of this
legislation, see Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699,
721-24 (1995). But see 1995 FJC REPORT, supra note 84, at 4 (indicating fairly substantial
support among the bench and the bar for the safe harbor provision).
105 Scalia Dissent, supra note 75, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 508.
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the undeniable benefits to judicial administration created by the provision, which
alone are sufficient to rebut any argument for its elimination.
10 6
Thus, the question remains: what happens to the careless, incompetent, or ill-
intentioned attorneys who avoid sanctions by resorting to the safe harbor
provision? The very disconcerting answer is almost certainly "nothing." In the
context of a lawsuit itself, this is consistent with the judicial efficiency goal of
amended Rule 11, already discussed.'0 7 Under the 1983 version of the rule, judges
and litigants were perceived to have been devoting far too much time to sanctions
issues, distracting their attention from the actual merits of particular litigation, and
undermining the adversary process generally.'08 Unfortunately, the more
judicially efficient, modem Rule 11 also insulates potentially unethical conduct, at
least from sanction by the district courts themselves.
Furthermore, it is virtually inconceivable that an attorney who convinces
opposing counsel to withdraw or correct an offending paper will take any
additional action with regard to the matter.109 Experience suggests that the
successful attorney will view a withdrawal or correction by the Rule 11 violator
as a victory of sorts; or at least that is how he or she will probably justify the fees
charged for preparation of a Rule 11 motion that was never even filed. °"0 The
perception of most attorneys seems to be that Rule 11 is the only applicable
ethical constraint regarding frivolous filings in federal district courts, and because
the rule provides no apparent recourse following the exercise of "safe harbor"
privileges, there is nothing left for a non-offending attorney to do."'
06 See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also supra note 84.
07Tid.
1osSee supra note 40-41 and accompanying text.
'09See, e.g., Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 45 (noting that "private
parties have little incentive to inform the court about Rule 11 misconduct, especially if it has
been corrected"); see also supra note 89.
'10 Ironically, claims that attorneys may deem to be objectively ludicrous may call for very
extensive research and argument in connection with a Rule 11 motion. This is so because the
non-offending attorney likely will feel compelled to address any and all potential arguments
that can be made by the offending attorney, both factual and legal. See supra note 89. In one
case in which I was involved, besides conducting legal research regarding the invalidity of the
offending lawyer's claims, we also found it necessary to obtain affidavits from witnesses to
show the absence of any evidentiary support for the claims. Our diligence had the desired effect
(on the twentieth day), but at an unrecompensed price. For an example of the extensive time,
effort, and expense that can be devoted to responding to patently frivolous claims, see Frantz v.
United States Powerlifiing Federation, 836 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1987).
' Professor Pamess has argued for adoption of local federal court rules that would require
"lawyers to notify trial judges of egregious misconduct which has been corrected within the
safe harbor period." Pamess, Different Sanctions, supra note 62, at 128; see also Parness, Fines,
supra note 30, at 898-99. It would appear, however, that the enactment of such mandatory
reporting rules within the federal court system itself could undermine the purpose of the safe
harbor provision; see supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. See also supra note 82 and
accompanying text. Further, focusing only on specific instances of "egregious misconduct" fails
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Hence, the incompetent, careless, and ill-intentioned lawyers are essentially
accepted, tolerated, or rationalized as part and parcel of the adversary process,
provided that they take refuge within the very rule designed to ferret out and
prevent their litigation misconduct. This sends the disturbing message that it is
acceptable for attorneys to misuse or abuse the system, so long as they are willing
to cease doing so when challenged in a given case. Indeed, such behavior can
theoretically be repeated indefinitely, both within a single case and from case to
case, in light of the safe harbor provision." 2 Of course, given the protective nature
of the safe harbor provision, there is no record that can be examined in order to
verify the existence or identity of the serial abuser. Anecdotal evidence suggests,
however, that such recidivism, so to speak, is more than just a hypothetical
problem.1
3
It is possible that such abuse could be dealt with by pursuing a motion for
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927"1 and/or the court's inherent authority, or
through exercise of the courts' contempt powers.' " Even so, given the various
to address the problem of the habitual violator whose isolated conduct may not appear
sufficiently "flagrant." The better alternative is to focus on altering the existing duty to report
under the parallel state disciplinary systems, which covers both egregious and habitual, non-
egregious violations of Rule 11. See infra Part IV; see also Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals,
supra note 24, at 61 (noting obligation of attorneys, under certain circumstances, to report even
those lawyers who withdraw their papers under the safe harbor provision); Parness, Fines,
supra note 30, at 898 & n.l I 1 (appearing to acknowledge attorneys' obligation to report Rule
I l-type violations to the appropriate disciplinary agencies).
12 See, e.g., HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.9, at 27-20 (noting potential for abusive
lawyers to file a "series of frivolous papers" in light of the safe harbor provision).
13Interviews of a sampling of experienced attorneys practicing in various areas of
litigation revealed a general belief that such unrestrained serial abuse occurs, not merely
because of the safe harbor provision, but perhaps more significantly, because of the perception
that courts are unlikely to impose sanctions in any event. In other words, the perceived futility
of pursuing relief under Rule 11 may lead many attorneys to simply "grin (or frown) and bear
it." E-Mail Interview with Jeffrey 0. Bramlett, Trial, Appellate, & Professional Liability
Litigator, Bondurant, Mixon & Elmore, Atlanta, Ga. (February 13, 2001); Telephone Interview
with John E. Burgess, Corporate Litigation Counsel, Georgia-Pacific Corp. (December 26,
2000); E-Mail Interview with John A. Chandler, Securities & Professional Liability Litigator,
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP (February 15, 2001); E-Mail Interview with Kevin E.
Grady, Antitrust & Healthcare Litigator, Alston & Bird LLP (February 16, 2001) (also
suggesting that some of the unsanctioned, "abusive" lawyers actually resort to Rule 11 itself as
a vehicle for harassment); see also supra notes 33, 88.
114 Section 1927 provides that:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court'to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (emphasis added).
'See FED. R. CIw. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments (noting that
Rule 11 "does not inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent powers,
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problems attendant to such motions, as well as the widespread perception that
resort to the safe harbor provision sounds the death knell for possible sanctions,
section 1927-type relief does not appear to represent a meaningful alternative.
Specifically, the express language of this code section establishes that
sanctions thereunder are proper for unreasonable and vexatious conduct that
"multiplies the proceedings."'1 16 As a result, invocation of section 1927 is
typically only appropriate for intentional or bad faith misconduct,117 or at least
conduct of a very egregious nature."1 Consequently, it seems like little more than
a throw-back to the 1938 version of Rule 11, which required a showing of
subjective bad faith to establish a violation. 9 It follows, therefore, that utilization
of section 1927 when Rule 11 is unavailable will carry with it the same types of
problems associated with the 1938 version of Rule 11 (i.e., lack of use).120 This
seems like an obvious step in the wrong direction, particularly in light of the
central deterrent purpose of the present version of Rule 11.
Thus, notwithstanding section 1927, there exists a strong potential for serial
litigation misconduct in the face of Rule 11. This highlights the irreconcilable
discordancy between the primary purpose of the rule-deterrence of frivolous
filings-and the somewhat less important purposes of judicial and adversarial
efficiency. Paradoxically, the latter seem to have been given primacy under the
rule. If ethics in the pleading process or in motion practice are to mean anything,
there must be some vehicle for resuscitating the deterrent component of Rule 11.
The logical place to look for such a vehicle is the disciplinary process.121
or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or directing remedial action authorized under
other rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927"); JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 314; Cavanagh, supra note
32, at 399-400. But see Schwarzer, New Era, supra note 26, at 27 n.86 (noting that the courts'
inherent powers and section 1927 are not substitutes for Rule 11 in light of the different conduct
targeted and the greater standard of proof required).
11628 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
"'See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.11, 27-24 (noting that section 1927 has
"generally been read to apply only upon a finding of intent to harass or at least recklessness'); 2
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.40 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that,
under section 1927, "most circuits require a finding of bad faith").
18 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 117, § 11.40 (recognizing that some circuits require a
lower standard of misconduct to warrant sanctions under section 1927--for example, "reckless
and indifferent conduct").
"
9 See supra note 32; see also Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 594-95 (noting that the
focus on making Rule 11 a more effective tool for improving attorney behavior was, at least in
part, a reaction to the disuse of both section 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction).
'
20 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 113.
,
21 See, e.g., Ripps & Drowatzky, supra note 26, at 84 (noting that "handling substantial
Rule I 1 violations through bar grievance committees would further enhance the purpose and
important role of Rule 11').
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C. Model Rule ofProfessional Conduct 3.1
Though Rule 11 is typically viewed as the primary, if not lone, instrument for
curtailing frivolous filings in federal district courts, it is not the only device
available. Besides section 1927 and the courts' inherent authority, 2 2 each state
has an independent disciplinary system charged with enforcing the state's ethical
rules. 23 In the vast majority of states, the applicable rules are modeled in some
fashion after the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, although a
significant minority base their rules on the earlier ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. 24 In a broad sense, these rules are intended to guide
the behavior of attorneys and to provide them with a general "framework for the
ethical practice of law."' 2S In a more narrow sense, they consist of certain
imperative standards, which if deviated from, can and should result in the
imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions.
2 6
The disciplinary systems vary somewhat from state to state in structure and
operation. 27 However, they are similar insofar as certain rules are rarely, if ever,
stringently enforced-mandatory phraseology notwithstanding. 2  One ethical
imperative that has been routinely overlooked by the profession and seldom
enforced by disciplinary authorities is Model Rule 3.1.129 Indeed, the lack of
122 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
123 See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 3.4.1, at 99; see also supra note 4.
'
24 As noted previously, forty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted or are
in the process of adopting some variation of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
See supra note 3. As a result of this and for the sake of clarity, this article will only focus on the
Model Rules.
12'MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope 14 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 5.
'
26 See id. Scope 13, reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 5 ("Some of the
Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms 'shall' or 'shall not.' These define proper conduct for
purposes of professional discipline.").
127 See LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 101:2004.
2In addition, some commentators have also observed that, for various reasons, state
disciplinary bodies are considered to be somewhat ineffective, generally, in dealing with
attorney misconduct. See Grosberg, supra note 26, at 660; Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at
590; Wilkins, supra note 1, at 822-30 (discussing the various problems that contribute to the
ineffectiveness of the disciplinary system). But see Weston, supra note 32, at 921 (asserting that
the "disciplinary process is utilized and is effective"); see also infra note 131.
129 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS § 110 crnt. b (2000)
(observing that "disciplinary enforcement against frivolous litigation is rare"); GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 386 (3d ed. 1999) (noting practical
difficulties associated with enforcement of Model Rule 3.1 and its predecessor under the Model
Code, DR 7-102(A)(1)); WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 11.2.2, at 595 (noting that "discipline is
rarely imposed for violations of the antiharassment rules"); Grosberg, supra note 26, at 657,
660 (noting that reliance on certain ethical rules, including Model Rule 3.1 "to improve
lawyering has not begun to approach the extent to which... Rule 11 has been so used");
Kramer, supra note 26, at 797-98 (noting the failure of disciplinary bodies to enforce Model
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enforcement of this rule, which closely parallels the language of Rule 11,130 may
have played a role with regard to the increased attention paid by federal courts to
Rule 11 after 1983. T3
Under Model Rule 3.1, "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for the extension, modification or
reversal of existing law."132 The similarities between this rule and Rule 11 are
Rule 3.1 and DR 7-102(A)(1)); Wilkins, supra note 1, at 838 (noting that "disciplinary action is
rarely taken against a lawyer for violating this longstanding professional command").
130 See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 588-89 (9th Cir.
1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (observing that both Model Rule 3.1 and the 1983 version of
Rule 11 "are properly seen as based on DR 7-102(A)(2)... in their treatment of what a lawyer
should not do"); ABA CENTER FOR PROF'L REsPONsImm, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT 300 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES] (stating that
"Rule 3.1 was conceptualized to address the same concerns as Rule 11"); RHODE, supra note 8,
at 431 (noting that "Rule 11 parallels and to some extent replicates the prohibitions in bar
disciplinary codes"); Carol Rice Andrews, The First Amendment Problem with the Motive
Restrictions in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 24 . LEGAL PROF. 13, 30 (2000) (observing
that "[ft]he stated aim of the ABA rulemakers in 1983, when they adopted the frivolous
standard, was to track contemporaneous changes in the rules of civil procedure') [hereinafter
Andrews, First Amendment]; Grosberg, supra note 26, at 657, 658 (noting the similarities and
overlap between Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.1, as well as other ethical rules); Weston, supra
note 32, at 922 (observing that the Model Rules address the same problems as Rule 11);
Wilkins, supra note 1, at 838 (observing that Rule 11 essentially "spell[s] out the traditional
prohibition[s]" embodied in both DR 7-102(A)(2) and Model Rule 3.1); see also infra notes
132-51 and accompanying text.
131 See Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 599. In particular, Professor Vairo emphasized
that federal circuit courts utilized Rule 11 as a means for attacking certain unprofessional
conduct, "%vhich was precisely the conduct that had escaped sanction by organized disciplinary
enforcement efforts." Id at 600; see also Kramer, supra note 26, at 798 (recognizing that "Rule
11 thus offer[ed] the federal courts an opportunity to enforce professional responsibility rules
that state disciplinary bodies have been unable or unwilling to enforce"); cf Schwarzer, New
Era, supra note 26, at 23 (noting that the 1993 version of Rule 11 "provide[s] for enforcement
of heightened professional obligations of lawyers engaged in civil litigation in the federal
courts"). But see Weston, supra note 32, at 927 (observing that "sanctions rules create a new
and unnecessary disciplinary process that is vastly inferior to the traditionally established
procedure').
132 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, at 61. The Model Code predecessor to Model Rule 3.1 provided that, in
representing a client, a lawyer could not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action
on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
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obvious and manifold. Like Rule 11, Model Rule 3.1 pays general, salutary lip
service to the profession's ostensible intolerance of frivolous claims, defenses, or
contentions asserted by attorneys. Though not nearly as detailed, the language of
Model Rule 3.1, along with the accompanying comments, is virtually
indistinguishable in substance and scope from the current version of Rule 11.133
More particularly, both rules were enacted to address attorney misconduct in
connection with positions taken or claims made in civil cases. 34 Each rule also
acknowledges that factual support for claims and legal positions need not be fully
established when initially asserted so long as such facts can be adequately
developed through discovery. 135 Furthermore, an action is deemed "frivolous"
under Model Rule 3.1
if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing
or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good
faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.
136
This demonstrates that, in its present form, Model Rule 3.1 covers the same
misconduct contemplated by Rule 1 1--papers interposed for an "improper
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(1)--(2) (1981), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 228. Earlier, Canon 30 of the Canons of Professional Ethics laid the
broad, aspirational groundwork for both Model Rule 3.1 and DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2):
The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work
oppression or wrong. But otherwise it is his right, and, having accepted retainer, it
becomes his duty to insist upon the judgment of the Court as to the legal merits of his
client's claim. His appearance in Court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion on his
honor that in his opinion his client's case is one proper for judicial determination.
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 30 (1908), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1,
at 809.
133 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 61, with FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See generally supra note 128.
134In fact, at least one commentator has suggested that "Model Rule 3.1 provides a more
thoughtful and viable method of dealing with frivolous cases than either... Rule 11 or the state
sanctions rules." Weston, supra note 32, at 924. It should be noted, however, that Model Rule
3.1 expressly exempts certain conduct by criminal defense attorneys that would be improper in
the civil context, namely. "[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the
proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 61.
135 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 2 (2000), reprinted in
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 61, with FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (b)(3).
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 2 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 61.
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purpose," as well as those that suffer from an absence of factual or legal
support.
37
One notable textual distinction appears to be with regard to the standard for
determining a violation. 138 While potential violations of Rule 11 are now judged
by a purely objective standard of reasonableness "under the circumstances,', 139
Model Rule 3.1 speaks of "good faith," which seems to connote subjectivity. 140
Despite this difference in the language of the two rules, Model Rule 3.1 has
nevertheless been interpreted as providing for the same type of objective standard
utilized in connection with a Rule 11 inquiry.
4 1
Furthermore, as of the publication date of this article, the ABA's Ethics 2000
Commission 42 had proposed revisions to Model Rule 3.1 and its comments,
137 See, e.g., Andrews, First Amendment, supra note 130, at 32 (noting that "to the extent
that Model Rule 3.1 standard was meant to track the procedural law, it also could have a
subjective 'improper purpose' component"). But see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying
text.
138 Another apparent distinction, which is not particularly significant for purposes of this
article, is that Model Rule 3.1 does not seem to be limited strictly to "papers" as is Rule 11.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 61, with FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (a); LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at
61:107 (noting examples of Model Rule 3.1 being construed to prohibit threats "to file or press
frivolous claims"). It must be emphasized, however, that the 1993 version of Rule 11 now also
applies to situations where an improper position is "later advocated" in the course of litigation,
on paper or otherwise. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and advisory committee's note to 1993
amendments ("[A] litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of... papers are not
measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include
reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after
leaming that they cease to have any merit.").
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
140 The comments to Model Rule 3.1 seem to further support this apparent difference in
standard. See supra text accompanying note 136; see also ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note
3, at § 22-1.1 (noting that the standard, as described in the comments to Rule 3.1, "hardly
appears to be objective"); Weston, supra note 32, at 923 (noting that Model Rule 3.1 apparently
differs from Rule 11 with regard to the issue of intent).
4"See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1, Model Code Comparison (2000),
reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 61 ("the test in Rule 3.1 is an objective
test"); see also LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at 61:107 (noting that "[c]ases applying Rule
3.1 generally utilize an objective standard along the lines of the objective test mandated by Rule
11"); Grosberg, supra note 26, at 657 (noting that the "reasonable lawyer" standard is
applicable under Model Rule 3.1); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.12, at 27-24 (noting
that Model Rule 3.1 "adopts an objective as opposed to a subjective standard to judge the bona
fides of pleadings and other court papers").
142 The thirteen member Commission's official name is the "Ethics 2000 Commission on
the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct," but it is commonly referred to as simply
"Ethics 2000." This body has been charged with:
1) conducting a comprehensive study and evaluation of the ethical and
professionalism precepts of the legal profession; 2) examining and evaluating the ABA
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which, if adopted, will further emphasize the link between it and Rule 11. The
single change to the text recommended by. the Commission simply "makes
explicit the requirement that a claim must have a nonfrivolous basis in both law
and fact."
143
A more significant change has been offered with respect to comment 2 of the
rule. Here, the Commission has proposed the inclusion of a sentence that will
highlight the fact that an attorney has a duty under Model Rule 3.1 to conduct a
pre-filing investigation and will also clarify the scope of that responsibility. The
prospective revision provides that: "What is required of lawyers... is that they
inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law
and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients'
positions."' 44 In addition, although the amendment contains the phrase "good
faith," the rule's reporter indicated that the purpose behind the proposed change is
"to remind lawyers that they must act reasonably to inform themselves about the
facts and law pertinent to a claim they will make on behalf of a client." 145 It
therefore seems that a standard of objective reasonableness along the lines of that
utilized under Rule 11 is more likely intended than a strict subjective measure. 46
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the state and federal jurisdictions; 3) conducting
original research, surveys and hearings; and 4) formulating recommendations for action.
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Mission Statement, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mission statement.html (last visited July 25, 2001).14 Rule 3.1: Meritorious Claims and Contentions, Reporter's Explanation of Changes, in
ABA ETHICS 2000 COMMIsSION REPORT, available at http'J/www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-
rule3 lrem.html (visited June 13, 2001) [hereinafter ETHICS 2000 REPORT].
'44Id. at cmt. 2. One might still contend that a violation of Rule 1 's more explicit duty to
conduct a reasonable pre-filing investigation would not also constitute a violation of Model
Rule 3.1, even with the revised comment. This potential lack of overlap, however, should not be
significant given that it seems highly unlikely that lawyers will be sanctioned under Rule 11 for
failing to conduct a pre-filing inquiry with respect to a claim, defense, or contention that is
objectively 'non-frivolous." See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in
Politically Motivated Suits, Rule 11, and the First Amendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1, 32-33
(2001) (discussing In re Keegan Management Co., 78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1996), in which the
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff, who failed to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry, was not
subject to Rule 11 sanctions for meritorious complaint) [hereinafter Andrews, Study]; cf. infra
notes 149-51. But see, e.g., Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that lawyers who filed a "copycat" securities fraud lawsuit based only on: (1) a newspaper
article; (2) review of the complaint that was copied; and (3) a conversation with the attomey
who filed the original complaint, constituted a failure to conduct a reasonable pre-filing
investigation and therefore violated Rule 11, notwithstanding the potential merit of the claims
asserted). See generally GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERsPECrlVEs
AND PREVENTLE MEASURES §5.03(b)(1) (3d ed. forthcoming 2002).
4
' ETHICS 2000 REPORT, supra note 143, at Reporter's Explanation of Changes (emphasis
added).
146 See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also ETHICS 2000 REPORT, supra note
143, at Reporter's Explanation of Changes (referring to the "objective merits" of a claim). But
see 17 ABA/BNA LAwYERs' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT: CURRENT REPORTS No. 12 349
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The final proposed revision to Model Rule 3.1 would eliminate the comment
that defines as "frivolous" an action undertaken at a client's behest for the primary
purpose of "harassing or maliciously injuring a person."'147 The proffered
explanation for this change is that "the client's purpose is not relevant to the
objective merits of the client's claim.' 48 If adopted, this change would appear to
be a departure from the "improper purpose" prong of the 1993 version of Rule 11.
It is unlikely, however, that this would prove to be a significant distinction in
terms of equating a Rule 11 violation with a Model Rule 3.1 violation. This is so
because of the evitability of a Rule 11 violation being founded solely on the basis
of the filer possessing an improper purpose. 149 Logic suggests that if one has a
valid legal and factual foundation for a clain, contention, or defense, one's
subjective motivation for asserting it will more than likely be irrelevant.1 50 In
(2001) (suggesting that rather than adopt a previously proposed "nonfrivolous" standard, the
Commission "returned the rule to its present, subjective 'good faith' standard") [hereinafter
CURRENT REPORTS No. 12]; supra note 140.147See supra note 136 and accompanying text (quoting comment 2 to Rule 3.1); ETHICS
2000 REPORT, supra note 143. For a discussion of a similar recommendation based on First
Amendment concerns, see Andrews, First Amendment, supra note 130, at 75-76.148 ETHICS 2000 REPORT, supra note 143, at Reporter's Explanation of Changes.
149 See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment
Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 713 (2000) (observing that "[c]ases rarely present the
improper purpose clause in isolation") [hereinafter Andrews, Motive Restrictions]; see also
Kruzansky, supra note 104, at 1385 (noting the somewhat pointless nature of the improper
purpose prong and arguing for its elimination). But see Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra, at
715-16 (discussing dicta in cases that suggests at least the possibility of sanctions for a
complaint filed for an improper purpose and one case in which this was actually done);
Kruzansky, supra note 104, at 1382-83 (acknowledging minority position espoused by the
Seventh Circuit that "a claim filed for the improper purpose of needlessly increasing litigation
costs should be penalized, whether the legal arguments contained within the claim are valid or
not") (citing Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Cf Andrews, Study, supra note 144, at 26 (noting that most courts that "refuse to sanction
meritorious complaints ... leave open the possibility of sanctions against litigants who file
motions for improper purposes").
150 See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 149, at 714 (discussing jurisdictions that
have interpreted Rule I 1 as not permitting "sanctions for a plaintiff's improper purpose if his
complaint is otherwise meritorious"); Kruzansky, supra note 104, at 1378-79 (noting that the
majority position is that "so long as the complaint itself is nonfrivolous, any suggestion of an
improper purpose (such as harassment) must fail because, by definition, if a claim is colorable,
a proper purpose exists for its being brought"); see also JOSEPH, supra note 30, §13(c), at 222
(noting that "while sanctions may be imposed for presenting a meritorious paper for an
improper purpose, courts should be, and are, circumspect about doing so"); Andrews, Study,
supra note 144, at 7 (generally arguing that so long as "underlying claims have some merit,
courts must allow politically motivated lawsuits"). But see JOSEPH, supra note 30, §13(c), at
221 (contending that "[tihe prevailing, and better, view is that... [p]resenting a pleading,
written motion or other paper for an improper purpose violates the Rule, even if the paper has
ample evidentiary support and is warranted in law"); Andrews, Study, supra note 144, at 26
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other words, the improper purpose prong of Rule 11 will typically only be
implicated in conjunction with some other violation of the rule-i.e., lack of legal
or factual merit.
151
Thus, the only truly significant difference between the 1993 version of Rule
11 and Model Rule 3.1 in its present or proposed form is the absence of a safe
harbor provision with respect to the latter.1 52 Under Model Rule 3.1, once a
violation has occurred, there is no mechanism whereby the offending attorney can
undo or retract his or her misconduct in order to avoid possible discipline. That
important distinction aside, the two rules are substantially the same.
Given the similarity between the content, purpose, and standard of the rules,
it is effectively inconceivable that when there is a violation of one there not will
likewise have been a violation of the other.1 53 In addition, an offending attorney
should be subject to sanctions under Model Rule 3.1 irrespective of whether or
not he or she takes advantage of Rule 1 l's safe harbor provision.1 54 Furthermore,
besides violating Model Rule 3.1, it is also quite possible that the same conduct
would subject an attorney to discipline under Model Rules 3.2 (duty to make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 3.4(c) (prohibition against knowingly
disobeying the rules of a tribunal), and 8.4(d) (prohibition against engaging in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).155 Nevertheless, the
principal ethical violation would be with regard to Model Rule 3.1.
Accordingly, one might reasonably expect that there would be more recorded
violations of Model Rule 3.1 than Rule 11, because the former governs lawyers in
both state and federal court and lacks a "safe harbor." This, however, is not at all
the case. While there is a plethora of reported decisions regarding Rule 11
(observing apparent differences in treatment of complaints and motions under the improper
purpose prong).151 Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 149, at 713 (noting that "[m]ost cases in
which the improper purpose clause is implicated also involve pleadings or motions that are
factually or legally frivolous"); accord Andrews, Study, supra note 144, at 31; see also id. at
98-106 (suggesting that violation of the improper purpose prong, when accompanied by
another violation of Rule 11, might properly be used as a basis for "penalty enhancement'9.
Furthermore, it currently appears that the improper purpose aspect of Model Rule 3.1 is present
in most state codes of professional conduct, despite the ABA's reform efforts. See Andrews,
Motive Restrictions, supra note 149, at 730, 733.
It should also be noted that a prior draft by the Ethics 2000 Commission of proposed
changes to Model Rule 3.1 would have made the similarities to Rule 11 even more evident. See
ETHics 2000 COMMISsION, PROPOsED RULE 3.1-PuBLIc DiscussIoN DRAFT (Apr. 12, 2000).
Nevertheless, the decision not to propose these changes fails to alter the fact that, as written and
as actually proposed, there remains substantial overlap between Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.1.
152 See supra text accompanying note 132.
15 3 But see supra note 144.
15 4 See supra text accompanying note 152.
155 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.2, 3.4(c), 8A(d) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN
&ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 62, 67, 106.
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violations,'56 in any given jurisdiction there are few if any decisions disciplining
attorneys for violation of Model Rule 3. 1.
It can be argued that to discipline an attorney under Model Rule 3.1 when
that lawyer has already been sanctioned under Rule 11 would be duplicative or
overkill.'5 s Such arguments, however, are misguided insofar as they ignore the
benefits associated with attorneys being subject to parallel discipline. 5 9 In
particular, a separate ethical rule regarding frivolous filings, such as Model Rule
3.1, can "prevent repeat offenders from escaping notice, and build confidence in
the legal system as a whole."'160 In addition, in the event that litigation misconduct
escapes a Rule 11 sanction because of the safe harbor provision or some other
reason, enforcement of Model Rule 3.1161 can ensure that such behavior does not
go unpunished.
162
Irrespective of the clear benefits to its parallel enforcement, Model Rule 3.1
remains rarely invoked, no matter what the circumstances. 163 There are various
possible explanations for this apparent inefficacy-none of them good. Besides
the perception that there are other procedural rules (e.g., Rule 11) that adequately
address such conduct,' 64 it is also possible that the standard of proof required to
establish a violation of Model Rule 3.1 is considered too exacting to justify the
:' See, e.g., supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 129 and accompanying text; LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 3, at
61:107 (observing that "[m]ost of the reported cases approving or imposing discipline under
Rule 3.1 involve both unfounded litigation and some improper motive or wrongful intent");
WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 11.2.2, at 595 (noting that discipline in this area appears limited to
"moves in litigation that sometimes seem more psychopathic than nasty, that involve patently
fraudulent schemes, or that arise in limited areas in which courts express a special concern for
lawyer forthrightness"); cf. McMorrow, supra note 26, at 974 & n.82 (noting that few reported
decisions have construed Model Rule 3.1).
'See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.12, at 27-25 (noting that some may ask
"whether a parallel rule of discipline is needed"); cf RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. b (2000) (noting that "[m]ost bar disciplinary agencies rely
on the courts in which litigation occurs to deal with abuse"). But see Jeffrey A. Pamess,
Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct: Achieving Reciprocal
Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. REV. 303 (1996) (discussing the need for reciprocity and cooperation
between state and federal disciplinary authorities and federal courts with regard to litigation
misconduct) [hereinafter Pamess, Enforcing].
'9 See, e.g., HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.12, at 27-25 (noting that at least one
rationale for having a parallel rule of discipline is to "prevent repeat offenders from escaping
notice"); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 3.5.2, at 122 (observing that "[k]nown repetition
[of misconduct] clearly implies incorrigibility'). See generally Pamess, Enforcing, supra note
158.
160 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 27.12, at 27-25.
16' Either alone or in combination with other Model Rule provisions, such as Rule 3.2,
3A(c), and 8A(d). See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
'
62 See infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
'
63 See supra notes 129, 157 and accompanying text.
164 See RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. c (2000).
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necessary effort.161 Specifically, in order to determine whether or not the rule has
been violated under the applicable objective standard, "either expert testimony is
required or [the tribunal] must resolve the issue as a question of law."'166 Counsel
may simply not want to expend the necessary effort. In addition, disturbing as it
might seen-, there may be a general lack of awareness amongst members of the
bar of the very existence of the rule.167 An even more troubling explanation is the
possibility that lawyers view Model Rule 3.1 as purely hortatory in nature, along
the lines of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 68
However, the most likely reason for the lack of enforcement with regard to
Model Rule 3.1 is the perception within the profession that such conduct is really
not that bad. Put simply, lawyers undoubtedly consider much litigation
misconduct annoying, fr'ustrating and maybe even harassing, but not technically
",unethical.' 6 9 Hence, they feel no obligation to report such professional
transgressions as required by Model Rule 8.3(a).170 These attorneys may seek
sanctions against the offending attorney under Rule 11, if possible; however, if
the misbehaving attorney takes refuge in the safe harbor provision, the odds are
that his or her litigation misconduct will go unpunished and undeterred, no matter
how egregious.
Indeed, one recent draft of Rule 1 of the proposed Uniform Federal Rules of
Attorney Conduct, if adopted, would appear to insulate completely all safe harbor
inhabitants, no matter how unseemly, from any sort of discipline. 171 The relevant
portion of this draft of the rule essentially prohibits the imposition of any state
161 See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 129, at 386.
16Id.
167 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 1, at 646 (suggesting that pre-admission ethics requirements
may "elicit[ ] no more than rote memorization and rapid amnesia"). Furthermore, lawyers who
are aware of Model Rule 3.1 may incorrectly perceive that the standard for a violation is greater
than for a violation of Rule 11. See, e.g., CURRENT REPORTS No. 12, supra note 146, at 349. But
see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
'
6 8 See supra notes 2, 27.
169 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text; see also supra note 113.
170 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105. For a detailed discussion of Model Rule 8.3(a) and why a
violation of Model Rule 3.1 triggers the reporting obligation, see infra Part 1I.
171 See FEDERAL RULES OF ATTORNEY CONDUC, Draft Rule 1, reprinted in 16 ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT: CURRENT REPORTS No. 6 158 (2000) [hereinafter
CURRENT REPORTS No. 6]. For a discussion of the need for the establishment of a uniform
federal system for regulating litigation conduct in federal courts, see Stephen B. Burbank, State
Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19
FORDHAM URB. L. 969 (1992). See also Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional
Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996); Katherine M. Lasher, Comment, A Call for a Uniform
Standard of Professional Responsibility in the Federal Court System: Is Regulation of
Recalcitrant Attorneys at the District Court Level Effective?, 66 U. CiN. L. REv. 901 (1998).
But see Note, Uniform Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, 111 HARV. L.
REv. 2063 (1998).
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sanction for conduct that is consistent with "the requirements or opportunities of
federal procedure. ' 172 Accordingly, under this rule (assuming that it is adopted
and enforceable), if an attorney withdraws a frivolous position pursuant to Rule
SlI's safe harbor provision, he or she will subsequently be protected from any
possible state disciplinary action.173 Such a rule would solidify the desuetude of
Model Rule 3.1 and further encourage the existing tolerance and legitimation of
inappropriate advocacy within the legal system.174
Given the ethical blackhole created by the Rule 11 safe harbor provision
(alone, and particularly in conjunction with the proposed uniform federal rule, if
enacted), there exists the potential for a large body of "unethical filers" about
whom the profession will complain, but who nevertheless will be permitted to
continue their careless, incompetent, or ill-intentioned litigation practices
unabated. The solution to this problem is not to amend Rule 11 or to enact some
new sanctioning or disciplinary provision. Rather, as discussed in Part IV, the
172 Federal Judges Study New Option for Uniform Rule on Attorney Conduct, CURRENT
REPORTS No. 6, supra note 171, at 155. The pertinent portions of the draft rule provide as
follows:
(c) Procedure. Federal law governs all matters of procedure in the United States
District Courts and Courts of Appeals [, [sic] whether addressed by the Federal Rules of
Attorney Conduct, Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy Procedure, Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, or Evidence; by judicially developed rules, by local court rules; or by the court
in its inherent power]. The court may, after notice and opportunity to be heard, enforce the
procedural rules and its orders by all appropriate sanctions, including forfeiture of fees,
reprimand, censure, or suspension or revocation of the privilege to appear before the court.
(e) State Sanctions Preempted. No state authority may impose any sanction, civil
liability, or other consequence on an attorney for conduct in connection with an action or
proceeding in a United States District Court or Court of Appeals if the conduct is
authorized by order of the United States court or by the federal law of procedure that
applies under Rule l(c).
FEDERAL RULES OF ATTORNEY CONDUCr, Draft Rule 1(c), (e), reprinted in CURRENT REPORTS
NO. 6, supra note 171, at 158. It should be noted, however, that other alternative draNts of the
proposed rule would not have as broad of a preemptive effect on state remedies available for
litigation misconduct. See id. at 158-59.
It may also be possible to read the proposed Uniform Federal Rule more narrowly to
encompass only conduct that is somehow expressly authorized by the federal law of procedure.
One could argue that the safe harbor provision does not authorize the conduct prohibited by
Model Rule 3.1; it simply allows one to correct or withdraw the wrongful paper and thereby
avoid a federal sanction. The broader reading suggested in the text accompanying this note and
infra note 173 nevertheless appears to be an equally if not more plausible reading and therefore,
creates a concern with regard to the viability of Model Rule 3.1.
173But see supra note 62; see also Parness, Enforcing, supra note 158 (discussing need for
reciprocal cooperation between federal courts and state disciplinary bodies).
17 4 But see supra note 172.
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most viable and logical course of action is to emphasize, reinvigorate, and
simplify the ethical duty to report.
175
HI. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.3
A. The History and Origin of the Duty to Report
As members of an almost exclusively self-regulating and self-policing
profession, 176 lawyers have traditionally been required, or at least strongly urged,
to report the ethical misconduct of other attorneys to the appropriate disciplinary
authorities. Indeed, the ABA's first foray into the codification of lawyer ethics,
the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics,177 contained the following aspirational
directive:
Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt
or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept without hesitation
employment against a member of the Bar who has wronged his client .... He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but also the administration of
justice.179
As the language of this Canon clearly reveals, lawyers were encouraged to
report certain misconduct of other attorneys and strive to maintain the dignity of
the profession, but such paternalistic behavior was not mandated.' 79
The discretionary nature of the duty to report, however, changed with the
ABA's adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.180
Under DR 1-103(A) of the Model Code, "[a] lawyer possessing unprivileged
knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal
or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation."'' This
175 See infra Part IV.
176 See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 2, 27.
178 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 29 (1908), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra
note 1, at 809. For a comprehensive discussion of the development and current state of the duty
to report, see Richmond, supra note 6.
179 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 177; Rotunda, supra note 8, at 979; Burwick, supra
note 5, at 139; Eastin, supra note 5, at 1273; see also note 27 (discussing the somewhat tainted
origin and purpose of the Canons).
'
80 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 178 (noting that "DR 1-103(A) created a mandatory
requirement out of what was previously discretionary"); Rotunda, supra note 8, at 981
(observing that "the Model Code made clear that [the] duty to report [was] not an aspirational
one but one of discipline"); Burwick, supra note 5, at 140 (noting the "transformation of the
disclosure requirement from permissive to mandatory"); see also supra note 2.
181 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1981), reprinted in MORGAN
& ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 170 (emphasis added).
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provision was extremely far-reaching in its mandate insofar as it appeared to
require lawyers to report every potential ethical infraction by other attorneys, no
matter how trivial.'8 2 Specifically, DR 1-102, a violation of which triggered the
duty to report, defined "misconduct" for purposes of the Model Code and
included, among other things: (1) the violation of a disciplinary rule and (2)
conduct that adversely reflected on an attorney's fitness to practice law. 183 In light
of this very broad definition of "misconduct," a lawyer was arguably duty bound
to report even the most minor professional lapses.
184
More significantly, the failure of an attorney to report any such minor
misconduct of which he or she possessed unprivileged knowledge should, at least
theoretically, result in the imposition of discipline on the non-reporting
attorney. 85 Though failing to report even serious misconduct has rarely served as
'
82See Richmond, supra note 6, at 178 (observing that DR 1-103(A) appeared to require
lawyers "to report even innocent and trivial ethical lapses by colleagues and friends"); Rotunda,
supra note 8, at 981 (noting "the breadth of the reporting obligation"). But see Lynch, supra
note 6, at 506 (noting the ambiguities inherent in DR 1-103(A) undermine the power of the
obligation).
183See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONsIBILiTY DR 1-102(A) (1981), reprinted in
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 169-70; see also Richmond, supra note 6, at 178. The
actual text of DR 1-102 read as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(I) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (1981), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 169-70. The non-binding Ethical Consideration that accompanied
this rule suggested an even more exacting standard with regard to the duty to report:
The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in
violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the attention of the proper officials. A
lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials all unprivileged knowledge of conduct
of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY EC 1-4 (1981), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, at 168.84 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 178; Rotunda, supra note 8, at 981.
"
85 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 178 (observing that under DR 1-103(A) "a lawyer who
knew of attomey misconduct and who failed to report it ... could... be held personally
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the sole basis for disciplining a lawyer,'86 the celebrated case of In re
Himmel 87was an ominous exception.188 In this Illinois discipline case, attorney
James Himmel was suspended from practice for one year as a result of his failure
to report certain egregious misconduct perpetrated by attorney John Casey. 9
Specifically, Casey represented Tammy Forsberg in a personal injury action
on a contingency fee basis.' 90 The case was settled, but Casey failed and refused
to disburse Forsberg's two-thirds of the settlement proceeds to her.'9' Forsberg
subsequently retained Himmel to assist her in recovering her funds.' 92 Although
Himmel clearly possessed knowledge of Casey's misconduct of basically stealing
from Forsberg, Himmel contended that such knowledge was privileged because it
was gleaned from his client, and therefore, not reportable. 93 The Illinois Supreme
Court disagreed, narrowly construing the word "unprivileged" in Illinois's version
of DR 1-103(A)194 to refer only to communications not protected by the attorney-
client privilege.' 95 In addition, the court seemed especially troubled by the fact
that a condition of the settlement, which Himmel negotiated with Casey on behalf
responsible for violating the Disciplinary Rules"); Rotunda, supra note 8, at 981 (noting that
DR 1-103(A) was a rule of "discipline").
156See Michael G. Daigneault, Am IMy Brother's Keeper, FED. LAW. June 1996, at 9, 12;
Richmond, supra note 6, at 179, 183; Burwick, supra note 5, at 146. But cf Richmond, supra
note 6, at 179 (noting greater number of discipline cases involving duty to report when there
was also other serious misconduct committed by the recalcitrant lawyer).
187533 N.E.2d 790 (111. 1988); see also Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 13
(Il. 2000) (reaffirming the principle that the duty to report attorney misconduct in Illinois is
absolute).
18'For thoughtful analyses of In re Himmel and its implications, see Richmond, supra note
6, at 179-83; Rotunda, supra note 8, at 982-97; see also Richmond, supra note 6, at 183
(noting that there is only one other reported instance in which an attorney was disciplined solely
for failing to report-an unpublished Arizona Supreme Court decision, In re Condit, No. SB-
94-0021-D (Ariz. Mar. 14, 1995)); Hussey, supra note 5, at 267.
'
89Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 796.
"0 Casey apparently had a standard one-third contingency fee arrangement with Forsberg.
Id. at 791.
191id.
192Id. Notably, Himmel's fee arrangement with Forsberg only entitled him to one-third of
any funds that he was able to recover from Casey in excess of the $23,233.34 owed to Forsberg.
Id.
193 See id. at 794. Himmel also relied upon the fact that Forsberg had already reported
Casey to the disciplinary authorities and that Forsberg had expressly forbidden him to report
Casey. Id. at 792-94. The court held that neither fact relieved Himmel of his ethical obligation
to report Casey. See id.
'
94 The Illinois version of DR 1-103(A) differed from the Model Code version in that it
limited the duty to report to acts constituting "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude" or
"conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id. at 793.
19saId. at 794. The court specifically held that the record did "not suggest that [the pertinent]
information was communicated by Forsberg to [Himmel] in confidence." Id.; see also Rotunda,
supra note 8, at 986-89.
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of Forsberg, was that no disciplinary referral would be made. 196 The court's
decision was surprisingly severe and served, albeit temporarily, to heighten
awareness of this important ethical obligation.
197
As noted, however, the Himmel decision represents one of the very few
attempts to strengthen and emphasize the duty to report.' 98 The norm under DR 1-
103(A) appears to have been non-reporting and non-enforcement of the failure to
report.'99 The ambiguity of the rule, as well as its apparent overbreadth, among
other things,200 resulted in the ABA significantly modifying the duty to report
again in 1983 in connection with its adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.20' The pertinent portion of the new reporting provision (Model Rule
8.3) directed that:
A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.202
196Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 796 ("We are particularly disturbed by the fact that [Himmel]
chose to draft a settlement agreement with Casey rather than report his misconduct .... Both
[Himmel] and his client stood to gain financially by agreeing not to prosecute or report Casey
for conversion."); accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383
(1994) (finding that a threat to file a disciplinary complaint against opposing counsel "may not
be used as a bargaining point when the subject misconduct raises a substantial question as to
[the] ogposing counsel's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer").
19 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 179, 182 (observing that In re Himmel "stunned the
Bar" and noting subsequent increase in attorney reporting in Illinois); Rotunda, supra note 8, at
991 (noting that the Himmel decision was "a dramatic surprise to the bar"); Burwick, supra note
5, at 146 (acknowledging claims that there was a marked increase in attorney reporting of
misconduct following Himmel); Hussey, supra note 5, at 266 (observing that "Himmel sent
shockwaves throughout the legal community").
19 8 See supra notes 184, 188.
199 See supra notes 184, 188; see also infra note 201.
200 For a discussion of the various problems contributing to the inefficacy of the duty to
report under DR 1-103(A), see Lynch, supra note 6. See also supra note 9.
20 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 178 (noting that Model Rule 8.3(a) was intended "to be
simpler and more enforceable than its predecessor"); Burwick, supra note 5, at 141 & n.21
(noting Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.'s observation that "the reporting requirement had
been narrowed because the Model Code provision had proved unenforceable in practice").
202 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.3(a) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105. As with DR 1-103(A), Model Rule 8.3 likewise contains an
exception for situations in which an attorney obtains his or her "knowledge" of an ethical
violation through a privileged communication. See id. Rule 8.3(c). The exception, however, is
on its face broader than that contained in DR 1-103(A), as Rule 8.3(c) "does not require
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6...." See id.; see also Richmond,
supra note 6, at 182, 195-99. Model Rule 1.6 generally protects from disclosure all
"information relating to the representation of a client...." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 18. For a discussion of the
2001] 1599
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
This rule was intended to define more clearly and narrowly the circumstances
.under which an attorney is obligated to report the misconduct of a fellow member
of the bar.203 Specifically, the reporting requirement is only triggered when there
has essentially been a serious violation of the Model Rules, 4 thus avoiding DR
1-103(A)'s flaw of including too much. Indeed, the comments to Model Rule 8.3
directly expound upon this point, noting that:
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to
report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement
existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. The Rule limits the
reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must
vigorously endeavor to prevent ....205
At present, with a few exceptions, all jurisdictions have an ethical rule that
mandates or strongly encourages lawyers to report the ethical misconduct of other
attorneys, 20 6 and the vast majority of those jurisdictions have adopted some form
of Model Rule 8.3.207 Given the increased specificity of the new reporting rule,
one might logically expect some alteration in the reporting habits of attorneys. As
the next section indicates, however, little has changed with the advent of Model
Rule 8.3.
B. The Reasons for and Effects of the Norm of Silence
Although Model Rule 8.3 is seemingly an improvement over DR 1-103(A), it
has apparently been no more successful in reversing the legal profession's general
norm of silence in regard to reporting the ethical offenses of other attorneys.208
There are many potential explanations for this continuing phenomenon.2 0
9
potential problems created by the broadness of this exception, see infra Part III.B. See also
Richmond, supra note 6, at 197-99 (describing, in essence, how the confidentiality exception to
Model Rule 8.3 may effectively swallow the rule); Rotunda, supra note 8, at 986-89
(discussing the effect of the Illinois Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of"unprivileged" in
In re Himmel).203 See supra note 201.204 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.3, cmt. 3 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105-06 ("The term 'substantial' refers to the seriousness of the
possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware.); see also
Lynch, supra note 6, at 513 (noting that the "misconduct [must] be serious before any
obligation to inform arises"); Richmond, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that "[o]nly the most
serious ethics violations must be reported").205 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 104.206 See supra note 5.207 Id.
208 As Professor Gerard Lynch has noted:
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First, the language of Model Rule 8.3(a) itself, though arguably more precise
than DR 1-103(A), suffers from many of the same ambiguities as its Model Code
predecessor. Under Rule 8.3, a lawyer is only required to inform with respect to
serious misconduct of which he or she has "knowledge."20 It is unclear, however,
what precise level of knowledge is necessary to trigger the obligation to report.211
Does an attorney need actual knowledge, reasonable suspicion, or something
else?2 12 Furthermore, given the ever-questioning nature of lawyers, many likely
find it difficult to conclude that they possess true knowledge of anything.213
The language of Model Rule 8.3 poses similar interpretive difficulties in
connection with determining what type of misconduct constitutes a reportable
offense.214 -The rule indicates that such offenses are those ethical violations that
"raise[ ] a substantial question as to [a] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
Although the Model Rules have moved in the right direction by limiting the
obligation to inform to situations in which the violation is serious, they have not carefully
defined the categories of information subject to the mandatory reporting obligation.
Instead, the Model Rules create an obligation that imports into the old rule yet another
ambiguous exercise ofjudgment.
Lynch, supra note 6, at 535-36.
209 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for non-reporting of
litigation misconduct). See generally supra note 9.210See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105.211See Richmond, supra note 6, at 185. The '"Terminology" section of the Model Rules
essentially defines "knowledge" in the following manner: "'Knowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows'
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Terminology (2000), reprinted in
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 7. This definition, however, is somewhat circular and
fails to give attomeys any meaningful guidance. See generally Lynch, supra note 6, at 506-15.212See Richmond, supra note 6, at 185-86 (pondering the level of certainty necessary to
constitute "knowledge" for purposes of Model Rule 8.3(a)). Although the "substantial basis"
test appears to be the "majority" approach with regard to determining the requisite level of
knowledge, even that test leaves much room for uncertainty. See id. at 186 (noting that the
substantial basis test "requires the reporting lawyer's clear belief or actual knowledge of
misconduct based on pertinent facts," determined from an objective standard); see also
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 130, at 577 (noting that "[a]lthough absolute certainty
is not required.. ., the lawyer's knowledge of another lawyer's unethical conduct must amount
to 'more than a mere suspicion") (citation omitted); Daigneault, supra note 186, at 10
(contending that "the 'knowledge' required must be more than mere suspicion or rumor and
must be actual, but need not be absolutely certain").213 See James E. Mitchem, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Ethical Violations, 18 COLO.
LAW. 1915, 1916 (1989) (observing that "[e]very lawyer who has been faced with surprise
evidence at trial develops a healthy skepticism as to whether he or she truly has knowledge of
any matter").214 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that "even the narrow reporting
requirement in Model Rule 8.3(a) is somewhat nebulous").
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fitness as a lawyer in other respects."215 Besides being deceptively broad, it
cannot seriously be disputed that reasonable attorneys could disagree as to what
types of violations fall within the rule's definition,21 6 though there are no doubt
degrees of serious misconduct about which no rational minds may differ.
217
Consequently, ambiguities in the text of the rule itself likely contribute to the
bar's non-reporting ethic.
Another contributing factor stemming from Model Rule 8.3's language
relates to its apparent precision rather than its ambiguity. Rule 8.3(c) very
specifically exempts from the reporting requirement "information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6, ''218 which broadly defines the duty of confidentiality owed
by lawyers to their clients. 219 In particular, Model Rule 1.6 provides in pertinent
part that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated
in paragraph (b).97220
It is of course highly probable that any "knowledge" that an attorney obtains
regarding the serious misconduct of another lawyer will emanate from
"information relating to representation of a client."221 Thus, unless the client
consents222 or unless some other exception applies,22 ' a large segment of
215 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105.
216But see Richmond, supra note 6, at 189 (contending that "[m]atters of opinion or
judgment upon which competent lawyers might disagree ordinarily do not involve the kind of
misconduct about which a report must be made").217See, e.g., id. at 190-91 (noting that criminal acts and misuse of client funds are
examples of misconduct that typically triggers the duty to report).
218 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105.219 See supra note 202.
220MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added). Subsection (b) of Rule 1.6 permits an attorney
to disclose confidential information to the extent reasonably necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id. at R. 1.6(b).
2'Id. at R. 1.6(a).
2nA lawyer should certainly endeavor to obtain his or her client's consent in order to
report serious ethical violations otherwise protected by the duty of confidentiality. See MODEL
RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 2 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra
note 1, at 105 (noting that "a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where
prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests"); Richmond, supra note 6,
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reportable offenses likely go unreported with the textual blessing of Model Rule
8.3.224 In other words, Model Rules 8.3 and 1.6 do not simply facilitate the norm
of silence, they actually impose it in many circumstances.225
Some more simplistic, though nonetheless significant, reasons that may
explain attorneys' reluctance to report ethical violations are fear of retaliation and
concern about being perceived as "tattletales., 226 Indeed, there is a tendency
within society to glorify those who remain silent despite the risk of personal
peril.2 27 In addition, certain practical. factors may also contribute to the lack of
reporting. Namely, it takes effort to report another lawyer-the reporting lawyer
must usually prepare and submit a written description of his or her accusations to
the appropriate authorities and may subsequently be called upon to participate in
some fashion in the actual disciplinary process. Put simply, informing can be
somewhat of an involved undertaking. Therefore, to avoid the hassle, many
lawyers choose to ignore the obligation altogether, particularly given the
perception that a reported attorney is ultimately unlikely to receive serious
discipline, if any.228 It is also possible that lawyers are not sufficiently familiar
with their reporting obligation to recognize when the duty arises or else simply do
not take this responsibility seriously.
229
The most troubling explanation, though, particularly among litigators, may be
a general numbness within the bar to unethical behavior. However, such
indifference to wrongful conduct is by no means indigenous to the legal
profession. Surely, not a day goes by without complaints from the citizenry about
the unseemly state of politics in America, or without individuals lamenting that
they could never aspire to elected office because of the overly-intrusive and
at 201 (contending that "[b]ecause effective self-regulation is critical to the legal profession ....
a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure so that the lawyer may report the
misconduct"). Such consent, however, may be difficult to obtain given that in many instances it
may be detrimental to the client's cause to antagonize the adversary by squealing on opposing
counsel. Cf. infra note 23 1.
23See supra note 220.224 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 197 (noting that the "duty of confidentiality
incorporated in Rule 8.3(a) supercedes a lawyer's obligation to report another attomey's serious
professional misconduct'); see also supra note 202.
22S See Richmond, supra note 6, at 199 (observing that "[t]he lip-sealing nature of Rule
1.6(a) may preclude the legal profession from regulating itself effectively").226 See supra note 9.
227See, e.g., SCENT OF A WOMAN (Universal Pictures 1993) (motion picture in which the
hero was a student at a private boarding school who risked expulsion rather than "squeal" on his
classmates); see also Lynch, supra note 6, at 491 (noting society's "ambivalen[ce] toward those
who report the wrongdoing of others").
22 See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 8, at 70; see also HAZARD ET AL, supra note 129, at
915-16 (citing statistics that indicate the relatively small number of disciplinary complaints that
actually result in any sort of discipline-and even fewer that result in serious discipline).
229See supra note 9.
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generally corrupt nature of the process. Yet, these armchair complainers typically
accept the state of affairs as a given-politics as usual.
Like with politics, many within the legal profession have grown accustomed
to the unpleasantries that all too often accompany the litigation process. Attorneys
complain about it,230 but by and large they do not act on those complaints.
Instead, they seem to accept, or at least tolerate, the "bad stuff' as a component of
the adversary system.23 Consequently, attorneys almost never report other
lawyers for litigation conduct that amounts to unethical behavior.232 Even worse,
there are rules and remedies parallel to the disciplinary process, such as Rule 11,
that give legal imprimatur to the norm of silence.
C. The Logical Inconsistency Between the Safe Harbor Provision and the
Duty to Report
As discussed previously, the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 effectively
creates a protective zone of silence around attorneys who assert frivolous claims
or positions. No matter how egregious or frequent the misconduct, these
"frivolous filers" can avoid Rule 11 sanctions by simply withdrawing or
dismissing the claim or position pursuant to the safe harbor provision.
233
Although Rule 11 protects lawyers only from sanctions within federal trial
courts, it has the effect of creating a much broader zone of protection because
there is an undeniable link between Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.1.234 When there
has been a violation of Rule 11, there will almost certainly have been a violation
of Model Rule 3.1, as well as Model Rules 3.2, 3.4(c), and 8.4(d), irrespective of
whether or not Rule 11 sanctions are ultimately imposed.235 Specifically, at the
moment when an attorney determines that there has been a violation of Rule 11
230 See supra note 11.
23'One commentator has insightfily observed that:
In the course of contending with the zealous representation of the interests of adverse
parties, the conduct of opposing counsel maybe viewed by a lawyer as merely an obstacle
to be overcome. A lawyer is not seeking to catch others in ethical violations. When the
objectives of a client are either achieved or defeated, the lawyer goes on to other cases,
perhaps not realizing that he or she has acquired knowledge of an ethical violation.
Mitchem, supra note 213, at 1917; cf William L. Hutton, Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report
Another Lawyer's Misconduct-In re Himmel, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 683, 689 (noting that "[s]ome
attorneys erroneously may believe that the duty to report requires [them] to act against the best
interests of their clients and could constitute a failure to represent those clients zealously").
22This obviously seems to be the case at least with respect to the assertion of frivolous
claims or positions, given that Model Rule 3.1 is rarely a source of discipline. See supra notes
129, 157. In federal court, non-reporting in this area is virtually guaranteed by the safe harbor
provision of Rule 11. See infra Part I.C.233 See supra Part II.B.
234 See supra Part II.C.
23 See supra notes 132-55 and accompanying text.
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and decides to prepare and serve the requisite "notice" motion 36 on opposing
counsel, that lawyer will also necessarily have determined that there was a
violation of Model Rule 3.1, among others, as well.2 37 Moreover, it goes without
saying that such a determination meets the "knowledge" requirement of Model
Rule 8.3(a) no matter what level of knowledge is deemed appropriate.2 38 Thus,
the duty to report is activated.239
Odds are, however, that no such reporting will occur. In fact, non-reporting is
virtually guaranteed if the offending attorney takes refuge under the safe harbor
provision. Why? Because if a lawyer is successful in convincing opposing
counsel to withdraw or dismiss a frivolous claim or position, that lawyer has
achieved a victory of sorts, akin to prevailing on summary judgment or on a
motion to dismiss. 240 Why would he or she expend further time and effort
reporting the other attorney? Indeed, such reporting could likely create additional
antagonism in the litigation, which might hamper the reporting lawyer's ability to
attain the optimal result for his or her client.241 Consequently, like Model Rule
8.3's confidentiality exception,2 42 the safe harbor provision also has a "lip-
sealing" impact on attorneys' reporting obligations.243 In effect, the safe harbor
provision encourages the very conduct about which the Illinois Supreme Court
236 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
2 7Seesupra notes 132-55 and accompanying text.
2'8Although it is somewhat unclear exactly what level of knowledge is required under
Model Rule 8.3(a), it seems only logical that if an attorney feels strongly enough about a
potential Rule 11 violation to be willing to go through the effort of preparing and serving a
formal motion, that attorney surely possesses more than enough knowledge of a Model Rule
3.1 violation to trigger the duty to report. See supra note 212 and accompanying text; see also
infra note 269.
239See Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 61 (noting that "even when
frivolous papers are removed during the safe harbor period, their presentment by lawyers
should be reported to state disciplinary agencies when substantial questions are raised about the
lawyers' honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness") (emphasis added). Rather than weighing whether
a Rule I /Model Rule 3.1 violation is "substantial" enough, it seems appropriate to simply
acknowledge that any such violation necessarily "raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105; see also
Lynch, supra note 6, at 540 (observing that "actions that obstruct judicial processes violate the
very essence of the lawyer's role in the administration ofjustice"); Richmond, supra note 6, at
193 (noting that "[a] lawyer who engages in conduct 'prejudicial to the administration of
justice' under Model Rule 8A(d) arguably is unfit to practice law"); see also supra note 155 and
accompanying text.240 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.241 Cf supra note 229.
212See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105; see also supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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was most disturbed in Himmel-the non-reporting of an ethical violation in return
for concessions in the substantive case.244
It can be argued that silence is appropriate2 45 and, in fact, that strict
enforcement of the duty to report in such circumstances would undercut the
purpose and intent behind the safe harbor provision 46 Both of these points may
be true, but they fail to consider the potential for a large number of undeterred,
abusive, repeat inhabitants of the "safe harbor.' 247 It is these repeat offenders,
those with a pattern of abusing the adversary system, that the applicable Rules of
Professional Conduct should be intended to ferret out and punish? 48 As
emphasized in the comments to Model Rule 8.3, "[a]n apparently isolated
violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary
investigation can uncover.' 249 The safe harbor provision, in essence, tacitly
encourages lawyers to treat every potential violation of Model Rule 3.1 as an
"isolated violation"' that need not be reported. Although likely unintentional, this
tacit encouragement to tolerate or ignore certain misbehavior within the litigation
process250 is inappropriate. To reverse this improper and silent acceptance of
Model Rule 3.1 violations, the next section proposes a revision to the mechanics
and scope of the duty to report in the context of litigation misconduct.
251
IV. PROPOSAL TO SIMPLIFY AND REINVIGORATE THE DUTY TO REPORT
As discussed previously, the current duty to report is neither a model of
clarity,2 2 nor an effective tool of the bar's "self-regulating" disciplinary
244 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
245As noted previously, a recommendation has been made to establish a uniform federal
rule that would ensure that no attorney who takes advantage of the safe harbor provision is ever
reported for a violation of Model Rule 3.1. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.246 See infra Part IV.B.247 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
248See supra note 159; see also Vairo, Rule 11, supra note 26, at 636 (noting that even
courts are "more likely to take disciplinary action when the attorney is a repeat offender of Rule
I1r). 249 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 8.3, crt. 1 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 105; see also Richmond, supra note 6, at 195 ("Rarely are serious
ethical violations isolated events. More often, the violation that the lawyer is contemplating
reporting is part of a pattern of misconduct.").
250 As alluded to earlier in this article, the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 is but one
example of the types of mechanisms within the adversary system that appear to sanction or
promote acceptance of improper litigation conduct. See supra note 17.
251 This article has focused on misconduct within the litigation process, and therefore, the
proposal contained in infra Part IV is geared specifically towards the adversary system.
Nevertheless, the suggested changes should be considered in the context of the duty to report
generally.
252 See supra notes 210-25 and accompanying text.
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system.25 3 Despite the importance of this duty to the attorney discipline process, it
seems as though little serious consideration has been given to enlivening Model
Rule 8.3(a) or making it more efficacious. 5 4
To be effective, any alteration in the mechanics of the duty to report must
accomplish two things: (1) it must make the act of reporting relatively routine and
easy, and (2) it must target those who have a practice of flouting the ethical
rules.255 Both can be achieved through the establishment of computerized
"litigation misconduct databases" within each jurisdiction. In addition, given the
large number of lawyers who are admitted in more than one state,25 6 a nationwide
network should be established to allow jurisdictions to access and exchange
information about attorneys. This network would eliminate the potential problem
of misbehaving attorneys changing jurisdictions in an effort to avoid discipline.257
The creation of a nationwide network to track professional misconduct is not
an entirely novel concept. The ABA already maintains the National Lawyer
Regulatory Data Bank, a voluntary national computer network that ostensibly
keeps track of lawyers throughout the country who have been disciplined by state
authorities.25 1 While certainly a well-intentioned gesture, this system has serious
weaknesses that render it ineffective, particularly with regard to the "illegitimate
advocacy" that is the subject of this article. First, the ABA's Data Bank only
includes those who have actually been disciplined, thus, excluding lawyers who
253 See supra Part llI.B and note 9.
25 For a discussion of some proposed changes to Model Rule 8.3 that might improve upon
the duty to report, see Lynch, supra note 6, at 539-45; Burwick, supra note 5, at 153-54.2 5 The current version of Model Rule 8.3(a) already sufficiently addresses and encourages.
the reporting of truly egregious ethical violations. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
As a result, there is no real need to alter this aspect of the rule.
256See, e.g., Frank J. Murray, Practitioners Almost Bulletproof When it Comes to Client
Complaints, THE WASH. TIMES, July 20, 2000, at A14 (noting that there are tens of thousands
of attorneys licensed in more than one state).257 Cf ABA, CTR. FOR PROF. RESP., LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT
OF THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 84 (1992) [hereinafter
MCKAY REPORT] (observing that "[w]ithout a fast and thorough system for tracking lawyers
who have been disciplined, a lawyer can avoid suspension or disbarment by moving to another
jurisdiction"); Murray, supra note 256, at A14 (noting that there is no foolproof system to
prevent disciplined lawyers from opening shop elsewhere).25 See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 257, Recommendation 20, at 84-85 (recommending
improvements to the Data Bank to promote greater accessibility and efficiency). The medical
profession maintains the National Practitioner Data Bank, which contains information on
physicians and dentists regarding all medical malpractice payments and certain professional
review actions. See National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and
Other Healthcare Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (2000). The current version of the National
Practitioner Data Bank is a bit more limited than what I believe is needed to address the
litigation misconduct problem, but it does at least provide a model that can be looked to for
guidance.
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have been sanctioned by courts, but not disciplined.259 The system proposed in
this article would include such lawyers, as well as unsanctioned lawyers who
have been reported for litigation misconduct, but not yet disciplined.260 In the
Rule 11 context, for example, the system would include those lawyers who have
withdrawn or amended pleadings after being served with a Rule 11 motion.
In addition to under-inclusiveness with regard to scope, the ABA's Data
Bank is also functionally under-inclusive in that jurisdictions participate on a
strictly voluntary basis, and the information that is ultimately posted is not very
specific. 261 The system proposed in this article would be mandatory with the
primary reporting burden resting on individual attorneys themselves, rather than
being subject to the bureaucracy of bar authorities. Notwithstanding the current
deficiencies in the ABA's Data Bank, it may be possible to coordinate that
existing system with the "litigation misconduct databases" proposed herein so as
to facilitate the establishment of a nationwide network.
262
The proposed change to the reporting system will necessitate an amendment
to Model Rule 8.3 to emphasize and highlight the reporting requirement in the
context of commonly overlooked litigation misconduct. Something along the
lines of the following should be added, possibly as a subpart to Rule 8.3(a): '
A lawyer's duty to inform under this rule is in no way altered or relieved by
the failure of a court to impose sanctions for improper conduct or by the
existence of other legal authority that may permit offending lawyers to avoid
possible court-imposed sanctions by taking subsequent remedial action,
including the withdrawal of a frivolous claim or contention.263 The reporting
259Various commentators have suggested that the ABA Data Bank should include the
names of lawyers who have been sanctioned under Rule 11, but at present it still does not. See
Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 43, at 1352 n.249 (noting the potential increased chilling effect of
Rule 11 sanctions if the ABA included published Rule 11 sanctions decisions in its Data Bank,
as was apparently being considered); Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals, supra note 24, at 66 &
n.158 (citing Professor John Leubsdorfs call for a "national [R]ule 11 registry" and the
MCKAY REPORT's recommendations to improve the National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank);
see also Grosberg, supra note 26, at 662 & n.360 (suggesting "[t]he integration of disciplinary,
malicious prosecution, malpractice, and Rule 11 information into a data bank with easy
accessibility" as a way to maintain centralized data regarding "bad lawyering"); John
Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RuTGERS L. REV. 101, 129
(1995) (noting the potential benefit of a "national data base for lawyers' disciplinary records").
While these recommendations are noteworthy and appropriate, the current proposal goes a step
farther insofar as it would include those lawyers who are guilty of litigation misconduct that is
routinely overlooked or endured, and therefore results in neither discipline nor court sanction.
260See infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text; see also supra note 259.
261 See Murray, supra note 256, at A14.
262See id. (discussing the push to explore "mandatory, computerized tracking" of
disciplined attomeys).
263 Cf Parness, Fines, supra note 30, at 898 (suggesting the incorporation of a reporting
rule into local federal rules that would "mandate (or at least encourage) those involved in civil
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obligation in this context shall be fulfilled by informing the appropriate
disciplinary authority of the name of the alleged offender, and supplying copies
of relevant pleadings and/or motions served or filed that relate to the alleged
litigation misconduct
In addition, an explanatory comment should be included that reads as
follows:
In any court proceeding, when a lawyer seeks sanctions or other relief for
the litigation misconduct of another attorney, either orally or by filing or serving
a motion or other paper, including but not limited to serving a draft motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or other similar state counterpart, the
lawyer's obligation under Rule 8.3(a) to report the other attorney's misconduct
will likewise be implicated.
Moreover, either the text of the rule or the comments thereto should also be
revised to explain clearly the nature and operation of the "litigation misconduct
database."
264
How should this computerized reporting mechanism operate? Take, as an
example, an offending lawyer who avoids Rule 11 sanctions by resort to the safe
harbor provision:
26
Lawyer P has asserted, on behalf of his client various legally and factually
insupportable claims against Lawyer D's client in federal district court. Upon
receiving a copy of Lawyer P's complaint, Lawyer D contacts Lawyer P and
says: "You've got to be kidding with this lawsuit" Lawyer P emphasizes that he
is not kidding, and suggests that a quick settlement might be a good way to
resolve this matter before incurring a lot of unnecessary legal fees and expenses.
Given the apparent frivolity of Lawyer P's claims, Lawyer D, after consulting
her client of course, decides that a Rule 11 motion is in order. Accordingly,
Lawyer D and her associate research and prepare a detailed motion and
supporting memorandum of law, accompanied by affidavits of key witnesses,
clearly setting forth the utterly meritless nature of Lawyer P's claims. On the
twentieth day following the service of these papers, Lawyer P voluntarily
dismisses all claims, without prejudice. 266
litigation to report their beliefs about significant Rule 11 attorney misconduct which will not
otherwise likely be subject to any court initiative or motion"). But see supra note 111.2
"Furthermore, states that currently have non-mandatory reporting obligations (i.e.,
"should report," rather than "shall report"), should amend their respective "duties to report" and
make them mandatory. See supra note 5.265 The example uses the scenario of a plaintiff filing a frivolous complaint but a defendant
asserting a baseless defense would be an equally appropriate illustration.
26To come within the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), assume that
Lawyer D has not yet filed her answer pursuant to the granting of several time extensions. As a
result, Lawyer P was able to dismiss the lawsuit unilaterally without prejudice. See FED. R. Civ.
160920011
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Under the present system of reporting and its accompanying attorney
mindset, Lawyer P's voluntary dismissal would likely be the end of the story,
267
no matter how many times. he may have previously acted in the precise same
manner. The proposed computerized reporting system would eliminate this
potential for unaddressed repeat abuse.
First, it is important to note that under the proposed amendment to Model
Rule 8.3, the duty to report would automatically be triggered at the time that
Lawyer D served her Rule 11 papers on Lawyer p.268 This is wholly consistent
with the "knowledge" requirement of Model Rule 8.3(a) because it is apparent
that upon serving the motion and related papers, Lawyer D possessed the requisite
awareness of a Model Rule 3.1 violation, among others, to activate her reporting
obligation.269 Hence, under the proposed system, at this point, rather than filing a
written complaint or grievance with the appropriate disciplinary body, Lawyer D
would report Lawyer P's name to the disciplinary body and submit copies of: (1)
the alleged offending pleading or paper (here, the complaint) and (2) the Rule 11
motion that was served. Lawyer P's name would then be entered into the
jurisdiction's "litigation misconduct database" as the "Alleged Offender" (or
some similar designation), with a brief description of the nature of the alleged
offense (i.e., "Rule 11 violation"). Lawyer D's name would also be entered as the
"Reporter."2 70 Because the reporting obligation is automatic, there is no need to
P. 41(a). Thus, the court has not and will not have an opportunity to learn of Lawyer P's
conduct.
267 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
268See supra notes 132-53 and accompanying text, and supra text accompanying notes
234-39; see also notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
269See supra notes 132-53 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes
234-39; see also notes 263--64 and accompanying text. It is certainly true that Lawyer D might
possess the requisite "knowledge" of a violation of Model Rule 3.1 by Lawyer P, even if
Lawyer D opted not to serve a Rule 11 motion. Under such circumstances, Lawyer D should
still have an obligation to report Lawyer P to the appropriate disciplinary body, but the fact that
she may not is less troubling than her failure to report following actual service of a Rule 11
motion. As alluded to previously, in this latter scenario, a situation is created whereby Lawyer
D would essentially be agreeing not to report Lawyer P in exchange for dismissal of Lawyer
P's claims. See supra text accompanying note 234; see also supra note 186 and accompanying
text. Such quid pro quo bargaining with the duty to report is highly inappropriate. See supra
note 186.
270In addition, it would also seem appropriate to maintain a record of the name of the firm
(if any) for which both the "Alleged Offender" and the "Reporter" work, so as to guard against
the potential for systematized litigation misconduct and/or over-reporting by a firm. For a
discussion of how the concern regarding possible over-reporting should be addressed, see infra
Part V.A. See also infra note 282 (discussing the possible need to consider subjecting law
firms to discipline in this context).
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notify Lawyer P that he has been reported-he should already know or at least
expect as much. 7'
If Lawyer P's name does not appear again in the database as an "Alleged
Offender" for a period of four years, his name will automatically be deleted from
the system, as will the information contained in his file, and the disciplinary
authorities will never investigate this particular misconduct. Though improper, his
one isolated lapse is not really the sort of misconduct that should occupy the
scarce resources of disciplinary bodies.272 In addition, the fact that his name does
not appear subsequently also suggests that having his name reported deterred him
from committing further similar abuses.
On the other hand, if Lawyer P's name appears in excess of three times as an
"Alleged Offender" within a four-year period, then an investigation will be
triggered by the appearance of a red flag next to his name in the database or by
some other prompting mechanism. As an alleged repeat abuser of the system,
Lawyer P is, at this point, deserving of the attention of the disciplinary
authorities.27
3
What happens if Lawyer P's name appears in the database in excess of three
times over a four-year period for alleged Rule 11 violations, but with regard to
two of those alleged violations, Lawyer P actually resisted the motions in court
and prevailed? Obviously, it may not be appropriate to subject Lawyer P to an
investigation under these circumstances. To avoid this possibility, it should be
incumbent upon the "Reporter" of an alleged Rule 11 violation to promptly notify
the disciplinary authorities in the event that the Rule 11 motion is ultimately
271 This of course raises the issue of what should happen if Lawyer D fails in her obligation
to report Lawyer P to the litigation misconduct database. Does Lawyer P then have an
obligation to report Lawyer D for failing to make the required report? If the answer is "yes," the
obvious problem is that Lawyer P would then, in effect, be reporting himself, as well--an
obligation that a lawyer most certainly does not have under Model Rule 8.3(a). See ROTUNDA,
LEGAL ETHICS supra note 3, § 54-1.4.2. The proposed system is intended and designed to
eliminate the evils and disincentives associated with reporting by making the informing
obligation relatively automatic and more straightforward and by placing more emphasis on the
duty to report itself. If the system is properly emphasized and implemented, the "non-reporting"
problem will hopefully be very minimal. Having said that, if Lawyer D fails to report Lawyer P
following service of the Rule 11 motion, and the disciplinary authorities are informed of that
fact, Lawyer D should definitely be subject to discipline under Model Rule 8.3. See supra note
269. 2 72 As noted previously, "repeat offenders" are and should be the primary focus of
disciplinary authorities. See supra note 159.
273 See supra note 159; cf Kramer, supra note 26, at 809 (noting that regular reporting by
federal district court clerks of all Rule 11 sanctions to state disciplinary authorities would
disclose the imposition of multiple sanctions against the same lawyer and that these repeat
offenders should be investigated). It should also be noted that to the extent that any single act by
an attorney is deemed particularly egregious, it may be more appropriate for a grievance to be
filed directly with the proper disciplinary authority, rather than simply reporting the alleged
offender's name for entry into the database. However, at a minimum, the latter must be done.
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denied or otherwise resolved favorably towards the attorney reported. Any such
additional information should be added to and maintained in the database.
The proposed system is intended to focus needed attention and limited
resources on those who are truly abusing the adversary system and flouting their
ethical obligations therein, without fear of reprisal.274 The system will also reduce
the disincentive to report by making the procedure relatively automatic and
straightforward. Under revised Model Rule 8.3(a),275 a lawyer who serves a Rule
11 motion has no choice but to report the motion's recipient, and therefore, the
potential tattletale stigma will not be as strong.276 Further, the reporting obligation
ideally could be satisfied through a simple e-mail message with the relevant
documents attached.
Consideration must also be given to the level of confidentiality, if any, that is
appropriate for the contents of the "litigation misconduct database." Because the
goal of the proposed reporting system is to reinvigorate Rule 11 by promoting its
primary goal of deterrence, complete public accountability would seem most
appropriate.277 Specifically, if the information contained in the database is
publicly accessible in some fashion, it will certainly impact attorney
behavior-conduct that presently goes virtually unnoticed would be available for
review by any interested party, which should serve as a strong deterrent.2 78
274 See supra note 159; see also supra note 113.
275See supra text accompanying notes 263-64 (setting forth the text of the proposed
revisions to the rule and its comments).276 See also supra note 271; ef Rotunda, supra note 8, at 992 (observing that a mandatory
reporting rule "serves to reduce the internal debate between one's desire to weed out the corrupt
element from the bar and the concern that one must not snitch, squeal, or tattle on a colleague").
277At present, most states allow for varying degrees of public access to disciplinary files,
but only Oregon appears to have a completely open system, permitting access as soon as a
request for investigation is filed. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Revised Lawyer Discipline
Process in Arkansas: A Primer and Analysis, 21 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 40 (1998);
Betty Weinberg Ellerin, Open Disciplinary Hearings, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46 (1997); Kristina
Serafini Pennex, Note, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy by Opening Michigan's Disciplinary System,
73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 569, 578-79 (1996). The ABA Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement allow for public access following "a determination that probable
cause exists to believe that misconduct occurred and after the filing and service of formal
charges, unless the complainant or respondent obtains a protective order." ABA CENTER FOR
PROF'L RESPONsIBILrIY, MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16(A)
(1996.
2 Cf
. 
Leubsdorf, supra note 259, at 129 (noting that a "national data base for lawyers'
disciplinary records could help the public to select ethical counsel and discourage unethical
conduct by lawyers"). Such public accessibility, however, will no doubt raise concerns
regarding, among other things, the privacy rights of lawyers. In other words, if attorneys are
improperly reported, or reported only once or twice, a damaging and unwarranted stigma will
attach. This concern is not well-founded. First, the so-called "stigma!' would be no worse than
the "stigma" to which any citizen wrongly accused or sued is subject within our criminal and
civil justice systems. Second, the mechanics of the proposed system should adequately address
such concems, in any event. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
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As with any proposal for change, the new reporting system will likely raise
some potential concerns, the two most significant of which appear to be that: (1)
lawyers will over-report; in a willful effort to use the informing obligation as a
"chilling" litigation weapon similar to the 1983 version of Rule 11,279 and (2) the
"litigation misconduct database" will undermine the purpose of the safe harbor
provision of Rule 11 because lawyers will no longer have as strong of an
incentive to withdraw meritless positions. Although understandable, the actual
operation of the proposed system demonstrates that such concerns are misplaced.
A. Danger of Over-Reporting
A legitimate concern regarding the proposed "litigation misconduct
database," at least in the context of Rule 11, is that lawyers will use the reporting
requirement as another "Rambo" litigation tactic280 designed to pound the
adversary into submission. There are no doubt lawyers who may over-report but
the structure of the process as well as some general professional dynamics should
minimize the likelihood of this happening.
First, under the proposed system, the reporting lawyer's name is also entered
into the database as the "Reporter." Unlike with the "Alleged Offender," a
permanent record of the number of times that a lawyer reports others should be
maintained. Hence, the number of times that any given lawyer reports can easily
be checked and, if excessive, could be raised as an issue in connection with any
disciplinary investigation. For example, assume that Lawyer D had reported ten
attorneys prior to' reporting Lawyer P and that Lawyer D's report triggers an
investigation of Lawyer P. There will at least be some circumstantial evidence to
undercut the credibility of Lawyer D's reporting of Lawyer p.28 1 In addition, there
should be a reporting threshold that, when crossed, would result in an
investigation of the habitual "reporter" for possible disciplinary action 8 2 for
Another potential concern is that an open system will encourage lawyers to over-report in
a malevolent attempt to disparage an adversary. That is, of course, a possibility, but again the
system will have safeguards that should limit such abuse. See infra Part IV.A.279 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
280 See generally Kanner, supra note 10.2 1 Furthermore, a permanent record of the reporting lawyer's firm, if any, should also be
maintained for this purpose. See supra note 270. In addition, as mentioned previously, a record
will be maintained with regard to whether or not a Rule 11 motion is denied or otherwise
resolved in favor of the non-movant. See supra text 1609. Such information could likewise be
raised by an "Alleged Offender" in his or her defense.282As with the "Alleged Offender," it seems that an investigation of a "Reporter" should
be triggered by a certain number of reports made within a specified time period-possibly eight
within a span of three years. Although discipline of law firms is not presently a possibility under
the Model Rules, it is something that should be considered, at least in this context. For a
thorough and thoughtful discussion of the concept of law firm discipline, see generally Ted
Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1991); cf FED. R.
Civ. P. 11(c) (permitting sanctions against law firms for violations of Rule 11). But see
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engaging in conduct designed to embarrass or burden third parties,283 or otherwise
prejudice the administration of justice.284 The fact that a lawyer's reporting record
will not go unnoticed and could actually result in discipline should greatly reduce
the likelihood of over-reporting.
285
More fundamentally, as noted previously, there is a well-known tradition of
reluctance within the bar to report colleagues.28 6 Although the proposed reporting
system will address many of the issues that contribute to the lack of reporting,287 it
realistically will not do much to eliminate the innate aversion to "squealing." To a
certain extent, this is a good thing because it increases the probability that only
those lawyers truly deserving of discipline will be reported. This in turn will have
a desirable effect on the use, or abuse, of Rule 11 as a litigation weapon.
2 88
Specifically, if Lawyer D is considering pursuing a Rule 11 motion against
Lawyer P, Lawyer D knows that if she does so, she will also have to report
Lawyer P's name to the "litigation misconduct database." Lawyer D may be
willing to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion, even if not well-founded, in the
absence of an automatic reporting requirement. With this requirement firmly in
place, however, Lawyer D is much more likely to think long and hard about the
appropriateness of a Rule 11 motion. Thus, the new system will have the
additional benefit of weeding out improper use of Rule 11.289
B. Undermining of the Safe Harbor Provision
Under the proposed reporting system, at the time that an attorney serves a
Rule 11 motion on opposing counsel, he or she must also simultaneously report
the alleged offending lawyer to the "litigation misconduct database."290 The
obvious question that arises at this point is: If the lawyer is going to be reported to
the database, doesn't that undercut the purpose of the safe harbor provision? In
other words, under the revised system, is there any real benefit to taking refuge in
the safe harbor? Furthermore, won't the knowledge that a lawyer will potentially
CURRENT REPORTs No. 12, supra note 146, at 349 (noting that the Ethics 2000 Commission has
withdrawn its proposals to subject law firms to discipline for ethical violations).283See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 4A (2000), reprinted in MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 79.284 See id.; see also id. R. 8.4(d), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 106.28 See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
286 See supra note 9, Part lII.A-B.
287 See supra note 9, Part III.B.
288 For discussion of prior use of Rule 11 as a "litigation weapon," see supra note 39 and
acconpanying text. See also supra note 89.
28 As discussed earlier, one of the main purposes of amending Rule 11 in 1993 was to
reduce the number of motions filed. See supra notes 84 and 103 and accompanying text. Thus,
the proposed changes to the reporting system will actually assist Rule 11 in achieving this
important goal.290See supra text accompanying notes 268-71.
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have his or her name reported to the authorities serve to chill creative advocacy in
a fashion similar to the 1983 version of Rule 11?291
Though understandable, these concerns should not be significant. First, it is
important to emphasize again that the primary purpose of Rule 11 is not
compensation, but deterrence of frivolous filings.2 92 The goal of the rule is not to
punish violators, but rather to prevent or at least discourage, violations in the first
place.293 The proposed reporting system complements Rule 11 in achieving this
desired aim.294 Lawyers will be fully aware of the potential ramifications of
pursuing claims or defenses that are lacking in legal or factual merit (i.e., being
reported) and will no longer take complete comfort in knowing that the safe
harbor provision can rescue them in a pinch. Recall that lawyers who routinely
seek the sanctuary of the safe harbor provision are typically careless, incompetent
or ill-intentioned.295 It is desirable to encourage these lawyers to reflect more
conscientiously on their claims, defenses, or other legal positions before asserting
them. The proposed system will have that effect.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the safe harbor provision is still a valuable
component of Rule 11. First, under the proposed system, a lawyer will not be
investigated unless and until his or her name has been reported in excess of three
times within four years.2 96 Although most lawyers likely do not want their names
reported, even if no disciplinary investigation is forthcoming, the fact that any
such investigation is not imminent under the new reporting system prevents the
safe harbor provision from being completely undermined. This is particularly
important for lawyers who make innocent mistakes.297 One of the main reasons
for delaying any investigation until after the third report is to avoid unnecessarily
going after attorneys who are not "worthy" of discipline. The focus is, and should
be, on repeat offenders. Moreover, in the end, the desire to avoid Rule 11
sanctions alone should continue to provide ample incentive for lawyers to take
refuge under the safe harbor provision when warranted.
One final point that deserves mention is that various amendments to Rule 11,
besides the safe harbor provision, ensure that lawyers, as well as litigants, will not
be unduly dissuaded from asserting novel or creative legal claims.298 Thus, Rule
11 should not even be implicated in situations where an attorney is making a
"nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
291 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 66-67, 70-71 and accompanying text.293 id.
294 See Ripps & Drowafzky, supra note 26, at 88-89 (noting that survey results indicated a
belief amongst the bar that reporting of at least substantial Rule 11 violations to disciplinary
authorities "would deter the filing of frivolous suits").295 See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.296 See supra text accompanying notes 272-73.29 7 See supra note 102.298See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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law or the establishment of new law"; 299 nor where the lawyer represents that
allegations initially lacking in evidentiary support, are likely to have such support
"after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."300
V. CONCLUSION
The adversarial component of the litigation process is the cornerstone of the
American justice system. ° Ideally, if two equally matched attorneys zealously
and competently represent their clients within the bounds of the ethical rules and
the law, the correct result will ultimately be reached.0 2 This ideal, however, is
frequently not achieved because, for one thing, many attorneys do not represent
their clients in a fashion consistent with their professional obligations. To make
matters worse, lawyers, judges, and the adversary system itself are accepting or
tolerant of such illegitimate advocacy. Even more troubling, this mindset is at
times, officially sanctioned or reinforced by the very rules or procedures designed
to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the process.
This article has focused on the example of Rule 11, which perpetuates a form
of advocacy that no lawyer believes to be legitimate-the filing and maintenance
of frivolous claims, defenses, or other contentions. The focus could have just as
easily been on the accepted use of peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
fashion 03 or the acceptance of discovery abuse as a part of the "litigation
game.''3°4 The fact of the matter is that there is a host of litigation misconduct that
either slips through the cracks of both the procedural and disciplinary rules, or
else is simply ignored. The key is to establish a prophylactic device that will serve
in the long run to discourage lawyers from engaging in such misconduct in the
299 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(2).
3
'°Id. at R.1 1(b)(3).
301See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 13; WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 564.
302 See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 565-65.
303 With regard to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury selection, the
comments to Model Rule 8.4 actually discourage the imposition of discipline for such
misconduct. Specifically, the comments provide that:
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words
or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing
factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges
were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4, cmt. 2 (2000), reprinted in MORGAN & ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, at 107.3
04See, e.g., Maute, supra note 12, at 52 (noting the tolerance of general discovery abuse
by observing that "[m]any lawyers regarded discovery as a game, with tactical delay,
harassment and evasion part of the unwritten rules").
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first instance. After all, the primary goal of Rule 11 itself is to deter, not to
punish.3
05
As this article has proposed, one approach to this problem would be to
reinvigorate the ethical obligation to report the misconduct of other attorneys. The
acts of litigation misconduct that are routinely tolerated or ignored constitute
violations that should be reported to the appropriate disciplinary authorities under
Model Rule 8.3. Because they typically are not, the potential exists for habitual,
illegitimate advocates to persist in their patterns of abuse. In order to eliminate
this, attorneys must recognize and understand that this sort of behavior, if and
when it occurs, will not go unnoticed and will indeed be dealt with in a serious
manner. The implementation of "litigation misconduct databases" throughout the
discipline system would be an effective way to convey this critical message to all
members of the legal profession.
305 See supra notes 66-67, 70-71 and accompanying text.
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